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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay (chapter 2)1 empirically investigates
whether South Asian countries constitute an optimum currency area (OCA) by applying
a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) model to trace global, regional, and domestic
shocks. Variance decompositions show that domestic shocks dominate regional and global
shocks, which contrasts with the findings for the European Union countries, used as a basis
for comparison. This paper concludes that at the present time the South Asian region as
a whole does not meet the prerequisite conditions of an OCA. The loss of an autonomous
monetary instrument can outweigh the benefits of a common currency.
The second essay (chapter 3) investigates the effect of extended unemployment insur-
ance (UI) coverage in the United States in recent years on job search. The U.S. government
extended UI benefits in several phases in 2008-2009, increasing the duration of the benefits
to a maximum of 99 weeks, up from the regular 26 weeks. Using the American Time Use
Survey (ATUS) data, I find that women are more sensitive to the extended UI benefits than
men. Difference-in-differences estimation shows that the average effect of the UI extensions
for women is over a 10 percentage points decline in the probability of job search. However,
I do not find any statistically significant effect on men.
1This chapter has been revised with Robert Thornton and Alex Nikolsko-Rzhevsky, and submitted to a
journal.
1
In the third essay (chapter 4), I study the evolution of relative wages, and quality
of school teachers in the U.S. over the past half-century. I analyze the quality through
the prism of a Roy (1951) model of occupational choice. The estimates imply that those
selecting to be teachers are more able workers than those schools would see from random
assignment. However, the ability distribution of female teachers is on the decline, while that
of non-teachers has steadily been rising. I supplement the Roy model with an examination of
the teachers’ relative cognitive attributes (measured by standardized test scores). I find that
teachers have lower average cognitive ability than that of non-teachers. And, the decline
in the quality comes on the heels of the declining relative wage. I show that lower pay of
female teachers than that of non-teachers is not a permanent phenomenon, but a new trend
emerging from 1990 onwards. To seek explanation for the rising wage gap, I use a model of
the rising demand for skills in the non-teaching sector, and find a secular demand for the
skills.
2
Chapter 2
To Be or Not to Be: An Optimum
Currency Area for South Asia?
2.1 Introduction
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a political and economic
association of eight countries founded in 1985, continues on a course toward regional inte-
gration aimed at an economic union by 2020. The launch of the South Asia Free Trade
Agreement (SAFTA) in 2006, which seeks to transform the region into a free-trade area by
2016, raises the question of the possibility of adopting a common currency. The currency
debate began in the political arena and news media after then Prime Minister of India Atal
Behari Vajpayee delivered a speech at the 12th SAARC Summit on January 4, 2004, envi-
sioning “an Economic Union, open borders and a common currency for the region”
(“Text of PM Vajpayee’s Speech”, 2004). Many observers see such a union as a platform for
overcoming prevalent political discontent and for focusing on closely integrating the region.
Additionally, the union is perceived as a way for the region to realize economic gains from
cooperation.
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Indeed, formation of a common currency could bring significant economic benefits by
reducing transaction costs of trading goods and services and eliminating exchange-rate risks,
thereby boosting trade and investment. A shared currency also decreases relative price
distortions as prices across the nations become directly comparable. Likewise, countries
could see other dynamic efficiency gains through an increased productivity of capital, and
they would no longer require a high volume of foreign exchange reserves to defend their
currencies (Gros and Thygesen, 1999).
However, the costs may outweigh the benefits if the countries’ underlying economic
structures are not ripe for a monetary union. The major disadvantage stems from relinquish-
ing an independent monetary policy. When faced with a domestic shock, countries would
not be able to actively respond by increasing or decreasing their money supply, and they
would have to rely entirely on fiscal policy. Additionally, joining a union implies non-trivial
preparatory costs, such as converting outstanding assets into a new currency, which could
reduce or even eliminate the potential benefits of a common currency.
In order to assess whether a currency union could bring a net positive economic effect,
the optimum currency area (OCA) theory is used. Its criteria are laid out in the classic works
of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) and include: i) labor mobility, ii)
openness of the economies, iii) product diversification, and iv) fiscal integration. Notably,
the traditional criteria are generally of a qualitative nature, thus failing to produce a single
well-defined approach for consistently assessing the viability of a monetary union. Recent
research has focused on devising empirical methodologies to quantify the OCA theory. One
of the most well-known examples of these methodologies is the introduction of the Maastricht
Treaty “convergence-criteria” used to evaluate the readiness of the European countries wish-
ing to join the E.U. Agbeyegbe (2008) uses some of the Treaty’s criteria to assess whether the
Southern Africa Development Community is suitable for a viable monetary union. Despite
some advantages, this approach is subject to vagueness in terms of interpretation and lacks
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a theoretical basis. Hence the criteria should be treated as necessary, but not sufficient,
conditions.
A more modern and, arguably, preferable approach in the literature to operationalize
the OCA theory is to assess the properties of underlying macroeconomic shocks to capture
and quantify core properties of many major qualitative criteria. In particular, a single
monetary policy should be effective enough to absorb symmetric region-specific disturbances
across countries, lessening the relevance of an autonomous exchange-rate tool. If the shocks
are asymmetric, on the other hand, other arrangements would be preferable instead, even
when convergence conditions are satisfied. Indeed, while the European countries joining
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) broadly satisfied the convergence criteria of
the Maastricht Treaty, some economists believed that several countries were not subject
to symmetric shocks (e.g., Salvatore, 1997). Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) find more
idiosyncratic shocks in Europe as compared to the states in the U.S., raising doubts about
the smooth functioning of the then-planned euro. Responding to the current euro zone crisis,
Krugman (2012) adds that architects of the euro took asymmetric shocks as a lesser problem
and that the OCA theory was not supportive of a common currency.
In order to empirically extract the shocks and study their nature for evidence of
potential suitability of a monetary union in a given region, one can use the identification
strategy proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989). Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), who
were arguably the first to adopt this methodology, apply a two-variable structural vector
auto-regression (SVAR) model to investigate the underlying demand and supply shocks in
Europe, and they compare the results with the U.S. findings. Buigut and Valev (2005) and
Huang and Guo (2006) apply a similar approach to study the possibility of a monetary
union in East Africa and East Asia, respectively. Despite the fact that there is recent strong
interest in a common currency in South Asia, the only related work I am aware of is that of
Saxena (2005), who applies a two-variable SVAR to identify demand and supply shocks in
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the region. Saxena (2005) concludes that the cost of a South Asian monetary union would be
low, stating that the sizes of both types of shocks are small with a relatively rapid speed of
adjustment. However, the main limitation of this and similar two-variable approaches is that
they ignore the role of domestic, regional, and global shocks. A high degree of correlation
in supply shocks across countries may lead researchers to justify a country’s suitability for
a single currency. However, instead of a domestic or a regional shock, such a correlation
might be driven by a global shock. In such a scenario, an exchange-rate system of a global
mechanism may be preferable to a common currency (Chow and Kim, 2003).
To overcome this drawback, I operationalize the OCA theory by explicitly estimating
the contribution of global, regional, and domestic shocks to the national output through the
application of a SVAR model. Symmetric exogenous shocks would imply that the countries
are integrated well with the outside world and, hence, that a single currency would be
suitable, or vice versa. Specifically, when regional shocks dominate each country’s output,
the region can embrace a single currency since all countries will be susceptible to similar
disturbances. On the other hand, when country-specific shocks are prevalent, each country
would be better off by having an autonomous monetary instrument to fight the heterogenous
nature of economic disturbances. This methodology was first proposed by Chow and Kim
(2003), who use it to calculate forecast error variance decomposition to study the suitability
of a common currency in East Asia. Following their technique, Zhao and Kim (2009) examine
if the CFA franc zone forms an OCA. However, there has been a paucity of research on a
South Asian common currency, a gap that I hope to fill with this study.
The target of our study is the eight SAARC nations: the seven founding members,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and a new entrant,
Afghanistan, which I subject to only a preliminary examination. I begin by examining some
of the most common “traditional” qualitative criteria of an OCA. If countries have free
labor mobility, a significant volume of intra-regional trade, similar economic structures, and
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fiscal integration, classical theory suggests that they could benefit from a common currency.
Likewise, the Maastricht Treaty’s convergence criteria are good indicators for gauging the
preliminary readiness for a monetary union. However, our analysis indicates that the South
Asian nations do not meet these criteria at this time. Nonetheless, a shared currency may
still be justified if there is a strong correlation of macroeconomic shocks across the countries.
Hence, I then look at the symmetry of macroeconomic shocks by extracting the un-
derlying structural global, regional, and country-specific shocks through the application of
the SVAR model to the seven SAARC countries for the period from 1970 to 2011. The newly
admitted eighth SAARC member, Afghanistan, is excluded from the SVAR analysis due to
data availability constraints and to its unique nature as a war-ravaged economy. Because
South Asia, like other regional unions, has been trying to emulate the EMU, it is appropri-
ate to compare the results with the euro zone countries. Therefore, I choose 11 European
countries that adopted the euro in the first phase in 1999 as our control group. For Euro-
pean countries, my main estimations are based on data from 1970 to 1998, as it would be
fairer to assess the current suitability of the South Asian countries vis-a-vis the suitability
of the European countries right before the launch of the euro. In my analysis, I treat India
as a “center of gravity” for a common currency in South Asia, and Germany as a “center
of gravity” in the euro zone, because of their dominant economic sizes in the two regions.
In particular, for the South Asian region, I consider the possibility of the SAARC nations
adopting the Indian currency, the rupee, as an anchor. The U.S. is used for both groups as
a country responsible for global structural shocks. However, I later relax the definition of
regional and global economies in the robustness checks.
The forecast error variance decomposition demonstrates that country-specific shocks
account for a significant share of South Asian countries’ output variability, with regional
shocks playing a very minor role. Additionally, the proportion of regional shocks in the
SAARC economies’ variation is much smaller than that in the euro zone economies, while
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most of the correlations of domestic shocks are insignificant. The impulse response function
analysis also shows that the economies do not respond to both regional and global shocks in
a uniform manner. Since the SAARC members are on the bottom rung of the development
process, it seems a far-fetched idea for them to set up a fiscal union or other mechanisms
to compensate a member for any monetary loss during an economic crisis. Consequently,
after taking into account the failure of both the traditional assessment criteria and modern
econometric analysis to show support for a monetary union, I conclude that the adoption of
a common currency in South Asia does not appear reasonable in the immediate future.
2.2 Data
I use data from four different sources. Output data for most South Asian and European
countries1 come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) published by the World
Bank.2 For the Maldives, Bhutan, and Ireland, the WDI coverage is limited; hence, I turn
to the United Nations Statistics Division-National Accounts.3 Output is defined as gross
domestic product (GDP) measured in constant 2000 USD. Because quarterly GDP data is
not available for South Asian economies, the data in this paper is annual, covering the time
period from 1970 to 2011.4
In addition to output, I also collect World Bank data on remittances, inflation, public
debt, budget deficits, and lending rates. Remittances refer to current transfers by migrant
workers plus wages and salaries transferred by nonresident workers. The inflation rate is
the yearly percentage change in the consumer price index. Debt refers to external debt
owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Deficit is defined as
1Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Luxembourg, Nepal, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sri Lanka
2The World Bank data is available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
3The United Nations data is available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnlList.asp.
4Prior to 1970, data are not available for most of the South Asian countries. Moreover, Bangladesh, one
of the important economies in South Asia, became independent only in 1971.
8
revenue including grants minus both expenses and acquisition of nonfinancial assets. The
lending rate is defined as the interest rate charged by banks to the private sector.5 I use the
Directions of Trade data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from the year 2002
to 2011 to calculate the trade-weighted regional and global GDPs, and intra-regional trade
for all countries except Bhutan. Lastly, trade data for Bhutan are compiled from the Bhutan
Trade Statistics due to its unavailability through the IMF.
2.3 Preliminary Analysis
A. Comparative Analytics
The classical OCA literature states that a monetary union works well for economies with
similar structures, a high volume of trade flows, and free labor mobility. Having a similar
economic structure and the same level of development indicates that countries face similar
problems or economic shocks, which could in turn make a single currency more desirable.
As shown in Table 1, South Asian economies possess largely similar structures in terms of
their production. The service sector accounts for the largest share of GDPs in all countries,
followed (with the exception of Bhutan) by agriculture. Due to the Maldives’ large reliance
on tourism, the service sector has a 82 percent share in its GDP. Moreover, the degree of
similarity in the structures of the South Asian economies in terms of production is not far
off from that of European countries (Table 2). I use the data until 1998 for the European
countries as our objective is to compare the current readiness of the South Asian countries for
a shared currency with the readiness of the European countries just before the launch of the
euro. For many South Asian countries listed in Table 1, remittances comprise a substantial
contribution to GDP with the major source for all being the Gulf region and East Asia –
hence a similar source of shocks. Finally, Nepal and Bhutan have already pegged their cur-
5The World Bank has two separate data series - the interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate)
and the deposit rate. Therefore I calculate the lending rate as the interest rate spread plus the deposit rate.
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rencies to India’s rupee. However, due to the varying pace of economic and political reforms,
these countries are in different stages of economic development. Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, and Nepal are the least-developed countries, whereas the remaining four – India,
the Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – are categorized as developing ones. India, which
accounts for around 80 percent of South Asia GDP, dominates the region, which is populated
by around 1.5 billion people. Appendix Tables II and III contain information about major
export commodities, and economic indicators of the South Asian countries.
An intra-regional trade relationship is considered to be another vital yardstick for
assessing prospects for a common currency. When countries have an increasingly large
volume of trade, their economic structures and conditions converge. Also, the more that
countries trade, the greater the potential gains from a currency union become. For example,
Alesina and Barro (2002) indicate that the countries that trade with each other in a larger
volume are the ones which reap more benefits from a shared currency, due to a reduction
in transactions costs. Table 3 presents shares of each SAARC member country’s trade –
both imports and exports – with other members based on the total trade volume from the
years 2002 to 2011.6 For example, the value 0.16 in column 3, row 1, for Afghanistan and
Bangladesh indicates that Afghanistan’s trade share with Bangladesh is 0.16 percent of its
total foreign trade. Other than Bhutan and Nepal, for which trade flows with India make up
about 78 and 58 percent of their total trade volumes, respectively, the South Asian countries
are trading with each other on a very low scale. For example, India’s trade share with each
of the other economies in the region is less than one percent. In contrast, as shown in Table
4, the European countries trade with each other in substantially higher quantities than do
the South Asian economies. However, we should keep in mind that there is a substantial
amount of informal trade among countries in South Asia due to porous national borders.
The final factor I look at is labor mobility. The free flow of labor from struggling
economies to surging economies in a currency zone is an important tool for tackling asym-
6For Bhutan, the time span goes from the year 2004 to 2011 due to data limitations.
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metrical economic shocks. In South Asia, there is no restriction on labor mobility from
Nepal and Bhutan to India. However, there are some restrictions on labor mobility in the
rest of the region. Even though there are no official data to formally analyze the current
trends in labor movements across the SAARC countries, one of the goals of a South Asian
Economic Union coming into effect in 2020 is free labor mobility across the whole region.
In Europe, labor can move freely from one country to another. In practice, however, its
mobility is limited due to informal barriers, such as the limited recognition of professional
skills, acquired in a home country, in other member states (Zimmermann, 2009).
B. The Maastricht Treaty
Fulfilling the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, which are laid out for European
countries to join the euro, lends further support to the pursuit of a currency union. The
Maastricht criteria are:
(i) The country must have an inflation rate within 1.5 percentage points above the average
of the three countries with the lowest inflation rates among European members;
(ii) The country should maintain its public debt within 60 percent of its GDP;
(iii) The country must have a budget deficit not exceeding three percent of its GDP;
(iv) The country’s long-term interest rate must be within two percentage points above the
average inflation rate of the three countries with the lowest inflation rates;
(v) The country’s currency must join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for two
straight years before adopting the single currency.
Table 4 reports the convergence criteria with respect to the South Asian countries.
Bhutan and India are very close to meeting the Treaty’s inflation criterion. But the Maldives
and Pakistan experienced inflation rates 5.80 and 4.89 percentage points above the average
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of the three-lowest inflation rates in the region. Due to data limitations, public debt in this
paper refers only to the stock of external debt.7 All countries have external debt of less than
60 percent of GDP. Half of the countries - India, the Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka -
have budget deficits higher than three percent. In terms of the interest rate criterion, only
Nepal appears to meet it. Bhutan has the highest interest rate of 14 percent, almost double
the Treaty’s standard.
To sum up, an examination of the economic structures, labor mobility, trade flows,
and the Maastricht Treaty criteria seems to indicate that the South Asian nations are not
well suited for a single currency.8 Nonetheless, a shared currency may still be justifiable if
for the countries macroeconomic shocks are highly correlated.
2.4 Empirical Specification
To uncover the underlying structural global, regional, and country-specific shocks, I apply
the methodology of Chow and Kim (2003) that is based on the identification strategy of
Blanchard and Quah (1989). Consider the following structural VAR which is stationary and
stable:
AXt = γ + A1Xt−1 + t (2.1)
where the vector Xt represents [∆gdp
g
t , ∆gdp
r
t , ∆gdp
d
t ]
′; i.e. the log-difference of global,
regional, and domestic GDPs respectively. Each GDP depends on its own lagged values and
lagged values of other remaining GDPs. Likewise, t = [
g
t , 
r
t , 
d
t ]
′ is a vector of global,
regional, and domestic shocks.
7Public debt is the sum of external (foreign) and domestic debt. However, external debt constitutes most
of public debt for the South Asian countries due to the rudimentary state of the domestic debt market.
8One possibility for dealing with these unfavorable indicators is the establishment of a fiscal union. Coun-
tries are required to follow a set of specific fiscal guidelines under such a union, and would be compensated
with the fiscal transfers during a crisis. But the formation of such a union does not seem promising in the
near future in South Asia.
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To explain further, the subprime mortgage crisis in the US and the subsequent 18-
month Great Recession lasting until June 2009 is considered to be a global shock. Another
example would be a sudden rise in oil prices. Hence, a global shock affects all world economies
at once. Regional shocks, on the other hand, only affect the countries within a region, albeit
in a similar fashion. Regional fluctuations in food prices may constitute a regional shock
in the South Asian context, as counties consume relatively similar food items while their
trade with the global market is limited. The current crisis in the euro zone would constitute
a regional shock for European countries.9 Domestic shocks that are specific to a country’s
economy would represent both aggregate demand and supply shocks. Monetary and fiscal
policies, and changes in productivity as well as in the terms of trade, could be sources of
country-specific shocks.
I assume that all countries’ GDPs are subject to a combination of these three shocks.
In particular, the system of equations is expressed as:
∆gdpg = µ1 + Θ11(L)
g
t + Θ12(L)
r
t + Θ13(L)
d
t (2.2)
∆gdpr = µ2 + Θ21(L)
g
t + Θ22(L)
r
t + Θ23(L)
d
t (2.3)
∆gdpd = µ3 + Θ31(L)
g
t + Θ32(L)
r
t + Θ33(L)
d
t (2.4)
where the matrix of lag polynomials Θ(L) =

Θ11(L) Θ12(L) Θ13(L)
Θ21(L) Θ22(L) Θ23(L)
Θ31(L) Θ32(L) Θ33(L)

=
∑∞
i=0 L
i

θ11
(i) θ12
(i) θ13
(i)
θ21
(i) θ22
(i) θ23
(i)
θ31
(i) θ32
(i) θ33
(i)

9However, it is true that the euro zone problems also affect economies beyond its regional borders,
including South Asia. So at least part of the shocks would be considered to be of a global nature.
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To compute the structural shocks, I first rewrite the structural equation (1) in the
following reduced form and then estimate it:
Xt = A
∗
0 + A
∗Xt−1 + et (2.5)
where Xt is a 3 × 1 vector of observed variables, A∗0 = A−1γ, A∗ = A−1 A1, and et = A−1
t. To uniquely estimate structural shocks from the reduced form equations, I need 3
2 =
9 restrictions. First, I assume that the variance-covariance matrix of structural errors D
= E(tt′) is a diagonal matrix. This generates 3(3+1)2 = 6 independent equations ( i.e. six
restrictions). Still, I need 3(3−1)
2
= 3 restrictions. Following Chow and Kim (2003), I therefore
make the three restrictions below. These restrictions are based on the assumption that all
domestic economies, both European and South Asian (with the exception of their regional
centers – Germany and India) can be viewed as small open economies (SOE). In particular,
I assume that:
(i) Country-specific shocks do not have any impact on the regional or global output in
the long-run. The rationale is that the size of each of the individual economies is too
small, relative to the size of the region and the world economy, to influence them in
the long-run. For example, if the US suffers from an economic recession, it may have
economic impacts in Nepal or South Asia. However, an economic recession (or boom)
on Nepal will change neither income nor prices in the rest of South Asia or the US
in the long-run, nor will such changes consequently affect their outputs. This implies
that:
∞∑
i=0
θi23 = Θ23(1) = 0, and
∞∑
i=0
θi13 = Θ13(1) = 0 (2.6)
(ii) Regional shocks do not have any impact on global output in the long-run. For in-
stance, neither a positive nor negative economic shock in South Asia will have long-run
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implications for the US economy. This means that:
∞∑
i=0
θi12 = Θ12(1) = 0 (2.7)
The moving average representation of equation (5) takes the following form:
Xt = µ+ Φ(L)et (2.8)
I calculate Φ(1) = I + Φ1 + Φ2 + Φ3 +....+ Φn as n −→ ∞ , where Φj = A∗j
∀j = 1, 2, 3, ....., n as n −→ ∞. In addition, Σe, the variance-covariance matrix of errors in
the reduced-form equations, is computed. Then I estimate, Ξ, where Ξ = Φ(1) Σe Φ(1)
′.
Using the Cholesky decomposition of Ξ, I derive
Ξ = Θ(1)IΘ(1) (2.9)
where Θ(1) is a lower triangular matrix. I represents an identity matrix. To extract struc-
tural shocks, I can find reduced-form errors et as t = Aet, where A = Θ(1)
−1 Φ(1).
Asymmetric country-specific shocks imply the necessity of an independent monetary
policy and exchange-rate system to cope up with idiosyncratic business cycle fluctuations.
As a result, a monetary union will be costly. The converse is true as well. The main focus
of our analysis is on regional shocks. If regional shocks are dominant in overall fluctuations
of national output, a common currency seems to be viable. Since the South Asian countries
have opened up considerably over the last two decades, regional shocks are expected to play
a greater role in their economies. Finally, a prevalence of global shocks would indicate that
the countries’ exchange rate arrangements should lean more towards a global, rather than a
regional, currency (for example the U.S. dollar).
15
2.5 Empirical Results
In this section, I present results from the structural VAR. Similar to Chow and Kim (2003), I
use U.S. GDP as a proxy for global output. Likewise, I use the Indian economy as a proxy for
regional GDP for South Asia and German GDP for European countries. In the robustness
checks, I explore other alternative definitions of regional and global economies.
A. Correlation of Domestic and Regional Shocks
I estimate the VAR(1) model for the seven South Asian and 11 European countries. Each
specification includes the first-difference of log GDPs – domestic, regional, and global – as
well as their first lags as independent variables.10 Since my objective is to compare the
current readiness of South Asia with the readiness of Europe right before the formation of a
single currency, I use data from the year 1970 to 2011 for South Asia and only until 1998 for
the European countries. It should be noted that the euro was launched on January 1, 1999.
A uniform lag length of one is chosen for all models. The resultant models appear stable
with the modulus of eigenvalues lying within the unit circle.11
From the reduced-form models, I recover the structural global, regional and domes-
tic shocks according to the methodology described in Section 2.4 Symmetric and positive
shocks are desirable for the prospects of a monetary union to be feasible. A negative corre-
lation means that a negative (positive) shock in another member would produce a positive
(negative) effect on the domestic economy, thus requiring different monetary policies. For
instance, if Nepal suffers from a negative shock such as a decline in productivity or a power
outage or increasing labor union unrest or a general wage rise, then the remaining economies
will see a positive boost. It is not uncommon for firms to relocate to another country to
10Each detrended series has been tested for stationarity using the Dickey Fuller Generalized Least Squares
(DF-GLS) test with the results presented in Appendix Table I.
11The results of stability tests are not reported due to space constraints. They are available upon request.
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escape negative shocks in their country of operation. When firms produce perfectly substi-
tutable goods and services and rely on the same market, a loss in one country brings gain to
another country. For example, suppose Nepal and Sri Lanka are exporting garments to the
US market. If garment factories in Nepal are unable to deliver on time due to local problems
and increase prices due to rising production costs, the U.S. importers would switch to Sri
Lanka.
Tables 6 and 7 report pairwise correlations of domestic shocks among the SAARC
and European countries, respectively. The correlations among most of the countries’ shocks
in South Asia are statistically insignificant. Correlations between Bangladesh and Pakistan
and Sri Lanka are significant at the five percent and one percent levels respectively. Likewise,
Bangladesh’s domestic shocks are significantly correlated with Bhutan’s at the 10 percent
level. By way of comparison, most of the correlations for the euro zone countries are positive
and significantly different from zero. These results imply that the economies in the South
Asia are affected by non-synchronized shocks with an insignificant common component,
suggesting a need for an independent instrument to address and adjust output fluctuations,
rather than a one-size-fits-all monetary policy.
B. Analysis of Impulse Response Functions
Through impulse response function analysis, I am trying to see how a one-time regional or
global shock, such as the Great Recession or a swing in oil and food prices, affects domestic
output in each country. It could be argued that, if domestic output in each country responds
to outside shocks in a similar manner, then the countries are good candidates for a monetary
union. Figure 1 plots the response of domestic output to regional disturbances calculated
from our models for the South Asian and figure 2 for the European countries. Figure 3 plots
the responses to global shocks for South Asia and figure 4 for the European countries. Since
by assumption the disturbances are not correlated, we can explain responses of domestic
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output to regional or global shocks, holding everything else constant. In particular, I am
able to measure the implied causal effect of the three shocks on each GDP.
The response of Pakistan to a regional shock appears to be largely different from the
rest of the South Asian countries. In light of its entrenched “political rivalry” with India,
the result is not surprising. Because of the rivalry, the countries have very low levels of trade
and economic linkages, as well as cross-border movement of people. Consequently, Pakistan’s
economy, which is not closely linked to India’s, has generated a response to the regional shock
that is different from the rest. For Nepal, the response path veers off to the negative, with
a positive regional shock hitting its economy negatively over about a two-year horizon. The
observations for other countries show that they have a long-term positive path of response.
However, the responses do vary in terms of both the magnitude and the adjustment period.
On the other hand, for the European countries (with the exception of Finland), all countries
respond to regional shocks in a similar way.
With regard to a global shock for the South Asian economies, the responses of Pak-
istan and the Maldives swing from positive to negative with different magnitudes and shapes
as the forecast horizon rises. One possible reason for the Maldives’ quite distinct response
is that its currency is pegged to the US dollar. However, the remaining economies initially
react with a negative response to a global shock. On the other hand, the European countries
have almost identical shapes for the impulse response. In a nutshell, the response functions
do not reflect the symmetry that would justify a single currency in South Asia.
C. Variance Decomposition
Arguably, the most important among the approaches I consider in this paper for studying the
currency union is the forecast error variance decomposition. It is based on the fact that the
three unexpected disturbances that I have termed as global, regional, and local shocks would
be expected to produce errors in forecasting a country’s output, and the respective share of
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each shock would signal the suitability of a particular exchange rate system. Specifically,
dominant regional shocks favor a monetary union, significant domestic shocks would argue
for an independent exchange rate, and a strong influence of global shocks would signal that
pegging to a global currency might be a viable option. Intuitively, dominant regional shocks
signal that countries within a region face similar economic problems or shocks and that a
single monetary policy could be suitable to respond to them. Similarly, dominant global
shocks indicate that the nature of countries’ economic shocks or problems closely reflects
those of the global economy. Hence, a monetary policy that works for the global economy
could also work for the countries, thus justifying the viability of a currency peg. I perform the
analysis using two different forecast horizons: a short-run horizon of two years and a long-
run horizon of 12 years.12 Tables 8 and 9 contain the results of the variance decomposition
from my benchmark models. Each value represents the percentage of variability in two-
and 12-period-ahead forecast errors in output which are attributable to each of the three
structural shocks.
For the European countries, the results are mixed (Table 9). The Austrian economy
has the largest contribution of regional shocks, which contribute around 38 percent to both
the short- and long-run variability in output. Likewise, Spain has about a 33 percent contri-
bution of the regional shock in the short-run horizon and about 27 percent in the long run.
The regional shock explains almost one-third of the variation in the Portuguese economy.
France, the second largest economy in Europe, seems to be considerably influenced by Ger-
many. Regional shocks account for around 28 percent of its economy’s variation. Likewise,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands each have about 20 percent of the variation in
their economies explained by the regional shocks. On the other hand, for Finland, regional
shocks seem to have a relatively smaller influence, accounting for about eight percent of
fluctuations in forecast errors of its economy in the short run. This appears to match well
the anecdotal evidence. Indeed, Finland is considered to be less integrated into the euro
12My conclusions are not sensitive to the exact choice of the forecast horizons.
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zone, with five of its seven largest trading partners from outside the euro zone and Russia
being its largest exporter and Sweden the largest importer (“The Finn Red Line”, 2012). In
addition, regional shocks play a minor role in the variation of the Irish economy, explaining
less than four percent of the variation, the lowest contribution among European countries in
my analysis.
The results largely agree with the current functioning of the euro-economies. Ireland
is the first country to face an economic crisis after the formation of the euro. Besides, it is
important to note that Ireland was among “the EU cohesion countries” - a group of countries
whose economic structures were different from the rest of the European members. Likewise,
regional shocks explain only around seven percent of the variation in the Italian economy.
Currently, Italy is one of the few European countries facing a sovereign-debt crisis with
a possibility of dropping out of the Union. The share of regional shocks in the variation
of the economies of Spain and Portugal–two other troubled economies in the euro zone–is
relatively higher than what we expected. However, it could be worth noting that domestic
shocks are still dominant in their economies’ variation, signalling their unreadiness for a
shared currency. Overall, domestic shocks demonstrate limited evidence of a successful and
smooth functioning of the euro. Nevertheless, the European countries seem to constitute a
better fit for a union than do the South Asian economies, as Table 8 shows.
In spite of India’s economic dominance in the region, it is surprising to see the low
contribution of regional shocks for practically all the South Asian economies. Sri Lanka,
which is an island, shows around a 14 percent contribution of regional shocks in the long-
run. As the country is geographically separated from the rest of the region and had been in
a civil conflict, it might indeed be not well-integrated into the region. The regional shocks’
contribution to the Maldives economy is negligible, just above one percent. Because this
archipelago nation is dependent on tourism and because its leading trading partners are
from outside the region, its economy is almost completely unaffected by regional shocks.
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In the face of its currency being pegged to the US dollar, the global shock has a minimal
contribution of around four percent. This is not surprising because European and Southeast
Asian countries are its leading markets for tourism as well as trade. Likewise, regional shocks
explain only around 11 percent of the variation in the economy of Pakistan, whose relations
with India have historically been shaky. Hence, this result is not surprising, either. The
results for other countries, however, appear to be more prominent. Indeed, regional shocks
play a higher role in the output variation of economies in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan
in both the short-and long-run horizons, especially when compared to other South Asian
economies. Regional shocks explain around 30 percent of Bangladesh’s fluctuations, and
around 20 and 18 percent of those of Nepal and Bhutan. One could expect regional shocks
to dominate the variation in the Bhutanese and Nepalese economies as both have pegged
their currencies with India and rely heavily on trade with it. Despite the currency peg, their
fundamental economic structures are vastly different, since they are at different stages of
economic development. The peg has long been viewed as a monetary convenience rather
than as an economic or monetary necessity.
Bangladesh, on the other hand, has been subject to a greater influence of regional
shocks compared to Nepal and Bhutan. First, Bangladesh is a breakaway country that still
maintains close ties with India. Second, due to its climatic and geographical proximity with
India, its agricultural production (rice being the principal crop) is similar to that of India.
Therefore, Indian policies have direct implications on its agricultural sector, which has long
been the backbone of its economy. Third, the textile industry of Bangladesh, the leading
source of its foreign exchange, is in direct competition with India, another leading exporter,
in the global textile market. Hence, any Indian policy or shock with regard to the textile
industry has direct influence on the economy of Bangladesh.
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D. Endogenous OCA Theory
An endogenous OCA theory has been gathering attention in the literature. The theory states
that, even if countries are not a good candidate for a single currency ex ante, they might
be well suited for it ex post. Frankel and Rose (1998), who popularized the theory, argue
that once a country enters into a monetary union, trade flows will increase, which in turn
could create more symmetric business cycles. This view was prevalent during the phase of
the euro’s design and is considered to have influenced the euro project. In their investigation
of the OCA endogeneity hypothesis, Vieira and Vieira (2012) find that in the first 10 years
after the introduction of the euro, core euro member countries have indeed experienced an
improvement in the OCA properties.
I first estimate the forecast error variance decomposition for European countries ex-
tending the period up to the year 2011.13 Table 10 contains the results. I then compare these
results with the ones from the benchmark model that uses GDP data up to the year 1998,
just before the introduction of the euro (Table 9). The contribution of regional shocks has
increased for all countries (except Spain) in the post-euro phase, lending some validity to the
endogenous OCA theory. For example, the contribution of regional shocks to the variation
in the Austrian economy increased by around 8 percentage points. With this increment,
domestic shocks are no longer dominant in its economy; instead, the role of regional shocks
has become the largest. For Italy, the contribution of regional shocks increased by approx-
imately 20 percentage points, the highest rise. However, regional shocks, notwithstanding
their growing role, are still unable to dominate the euro zone economies.
13Due to use of yearly data in our study i do not have enough observations to investigate only the post-euro
period (i.e. 1999 to 2011).
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E. A Smaller Currency Union ?
Even though our results do not support the idea of a single currency in the whole of South
Asia, it seems reasonable to consider the subset of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal.
Bangladesh has one-third of its output fluctuation explained by regional shocks. This is on
a par with the results for many EU countries. Bhutan and Nepal, which have historically
pegged their currencies to the Indian rupee, are more susceptible to regional shocks.
Most of the trade of Bhutan and Nepal is with India. India is also the largest foreign
investor in both countries. There is free labor mobility from both of these countries to India.
Likewise, India is the largest trading partner of Bangladesh. In addition, these countries are
politically, culturally, and geographically close to India. Therefore, they might contemplate
a shared currency, with the Indian rupee as an anchor. However, as part of laying the
groundwork for a common currency, these countries should first work to further liberalize
trade as well as the movement of labor and set up some sort of fiscal coordination or union.
To be precise, even if they are not perfect candidates for a common currency, there are some
indications that they would benefit from it due to their large volume of trade and close
economic linkages.
2.6 Robustness Checks
What regional and global shocks constitute may not have a unequivocal and unanimous
definition. To ensure that my results are largely invariant to the definition of regional and
global output, I next estimate three alternative models to calculate forecast error variance
decomposition. Table 11 contains results from these models for the South Asian countries,
and Table 12 reports results for the European countries.
In the first alternative model (Model I in Table 11), I define the sum of GDPs of the
three-largest Asian economies as regional GDP, and that of the US, the UK and German
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economies as global GDP for the South Asian nations. For India, regional output is the sum
of the GDPs of Japan, China, and South Korea, while for the rest of the countries it is the
sum of the GDPs of Japan, China, and India. For the South Asian countries, the results
for the regional shocks are close to those of the benchmark model, except for Nepal and
the Maldives. The effect of the regional shocks on the output variation of Nepal declines
considerably. Since Nepal shares an open border with India, along with a large volume of
trade and a pegged currency, the effect of the Chinese and Japanese economies is expected
to be lower than that of the Indian economy.
Likewise, for the euro-zone countries, I define the sum of GDPs of the three-largest
economies as regional GDP, and the sum of those of the US, Japan, and China as global
GDP. The contribution of regional shocks for Austria and Belgium changes slightly. For
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands it decreases modestly as compared to the benchmark
model. The Irish economy experiences an increase in the explanation of output fluctuation
caused by the regional shock. This seems to be intuitive in light of Ireland’s economic and
geographic proximity to the U.K. Similarly, France, Portugal, and Spain see an increased
role of regional shocks in the first alternative model in comparison to the benchmark model.
In the second alternative model (II), I use the same definition of regional and global
GDPs as in the first one, but instead of the sum I use the weighted average of the GDPs
to calculate the regional and global outputs. The results do not deviate to a large extent in
this alternative specification as compared to the benchmark model.
In the third alternative model, I apply a trade-weighted GDP in the first alternative
model specification. I calculate trade weight by summing both imports and exports of each
country i to the rest of the world from 2002 to 2011 and by dividing the country’s trade to
its respective partner country j during the period by its total world trade.14 Because of lack
14Consider the trade-weighted regional GDP of country i. GDPRegioni =
∑J
j=1 Tradeij×GDP j∑M
m=1 Tradeim
, where
Tradeij is country i
′s imports plus exports between countries i and j, GDPj is country j′s GDP, J is
the number of major “regional” economies, and M is the total number of trading partners for country i.
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of data, the trade weight for Bhutan includes slightly different years (from 2004 to 2011).
For the European countries, trade data before the introduction of the euro were limited.
Because trade weight is calculated using data from 2002 to 2011, I use the full sample of
GDPs up to the year 2011 to calculate the forecast error variance decomposition. Thus it
is more appropriate to compare these results for the European countries with those from
the benchmark model that uses the data until 2011 (Table 10). For most of the European
economies, the variation caused by regional shocks is close to that of the benchmark model.
France, Luxembourg, and Portugal experience a modest rise in the role of regional shocks.
Among the South Asian countries, the role of regional shocks in the explanation of the
variation in the Maldives’ economy is almost the same in this alternative model as in the
benchmark model. Likewise, regional shocks change only slightly for Bhutan and Nepal.
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka experience a moderate decline in the explanation caused
by regional shocks. Overall, the results appear to be robust in terms of the contribution of
regional shocks in each economy in all three alternative models.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate whether the South Asian countries could meet the underlying
prerequisite criteria of an OCA to form a monetary union. To this end, I assess traditional
OCA properties as well as the Maastricht Treaty, and I empirically operationalize OCA the-
ory. In particular, I apply structural VAR methodology to uncover macroeconomic shocks -
specifically global, regional, and local shocks. Forecast error variance decompositions suggest
that the SAARC members have not yet become well-integrated into the global economy, and
that regional shocks play a less important role in their output variation as compared to the
E.U. Rather domestic shocks explain most of the variability in the South Asian economies.
However, the results also suggest that a monetary union for Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and
Trade-weighted global GDP, GDPGlobali , is defined similarly except J is the number of “global” economies.
25
Nepal might be reasonable.
South Asian nations also can learn an important lesson from the experience of the
euro zone. The lesson is that fiscal integration and labor mobility are crucial for sustaining
a single currency, in addition to the correlation of macroeconomic shocks. Even so, in South
Asia fiscal integration seems only a remote possibility so far because all of that region’s
countries are in the early stages of economic advancement. Still they are working towards
implementing a South Asian Economic Union by 2020, which aims for free labor mobility
across the region.
On the other hand, we cannot overlook political factors too, since political motivation
also helped launch the euro. Feldstein (1997) stresses that the pursuit of the European
Monetary Union (EMU) was fundamentally a result of political considerations, arguing that
the economic effect from a single currency would be negative. It took more than four decades
for European countries to reconcile their political differences and disputes and to agree
upon a common currency. European countries entered into the Treaty of Rome in 1958 for
economic cooperation after the the Treaty of Paris in 1951 in order to prevent war, helping
to end the longstanding Franco-German rivalry. South Asia’s economic transformation has
been shaken and overshadowed by the geo-political rivalry between Pakistan and India, the
region’s two largest economies, over decades. However, the rivalry appears to have subsided
over the years. Nevertheless, both India and Pakistan still must increase their efforts to
end the rivalry, expeditiously embarking on the approach taken by the EU. It is possible
and feasible for the SAARC to achieve a similar type of monetary integration as the E.U.
The SAFTA is expected to give an impetus to regional economic integration in the years
to come, bringing the countries closer to monetary cooperation. Frankel and Rose (1998)
argue that increased trade relations could lead to an increased synchronization of countries’
business cycles. More important, if the SAARC members are able to effectively implement
their planned Economic Union by 2020, they might then see a considerable correlation of
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macroeconomic shocks, pushing themselves on a trajectory towards an eventual OCA.
In a nutshell, since monetary union has very serious and far-reaching economic con-
sequences, it is always better to cautiously and thoroughly assess its readiness. Overall,
the results in this paper imply that the region as a whole has a long way to go to achieve
a solid economic convergence, one that would generate clear evidence of positive economic
effects from a monetary union. Therefore, the countries should first expedite the process of
economic union and trade liberalization. Only then should they push forward the agenda of
a common currency.
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Table 2: Structure of the European
Economies
% share of GDP
Country Agriculture Industry Services
Austria 2 31 67
Belgium 1 28 71
Finland 3 34 62
France 3 23 73
Germany 1 31 68
Ireland 4 41 54
Italy 3 29 68
Luxembourg 1 21 78
Netherlands 3 25 72
Portugal 4 29 67
Spain 5 29 66
Source: The World Bank. The shares are
based on data for 1998.
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Table 5: SAARC Countries and Their Preparation Rel-
ative to the Maastricht Treaty Criteria
Inflation rate Deficit Debt Interest rate
Afghanistan 5.69 -0.61 13.68 -
Bangladesh 10.70 -0.92 24.17 13.25
Bhutan 8.85 - 59.77 14.00
India 8.86 -3.68 17.85 -
Maldives 12.83 -16.75? 47.94 10.20
Nepal 9.55 -0.99 20.95 8.00?
Pakistan 11.92 -6.48 28.63 14.42
Sri Lanka 6.72 -6.41 40.53 9.41
Source: The data are based on the year 2011. An asterisk (?)
denotes that I use data for 2010 due to data unavailability for
2011. The interest rate refers to the lending rate.
Note: (-) means that data are not available.
Table 6: Correlation of Domestic Shocks: SAARC
BA BH MA NE PA SR
Bangladesh 1.0000
Bhutan 0.2863∗ 1.0000
(0.1554)
Maldives 0.1164 0.1960 1.0000
(0.1611) (0.1591)
Nepal 0.0885 -0.1613 -0.1009 1.0000
(0.1616) (0.1601) (0.1614)
Pakistan 0.3950∗∗ 0.1934 0.0540 0.0066 1.0000
(0.1490) (0.1592) (0.1620) (0.1622)
Sri Lanka 0.4225∗∗∗ -0.1114 0.1217 -0.0264 0.2126 1.0000
(0.1470) (0.1612) (0.1610) (0.1622) (0.1585)
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 10 percent level, ∗ ∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ at the five
percent and one percent levels. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Response of Domestic Output to a Regional Shock: SAARC
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Figure 2: Response of Domestic Output to a Regional Shock: EU
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Figure 3: Response of Domestic Output to a Global Shock: SAARC
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Figure 4: Response of Domestic Output to a Global Shock: EU
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Table 8: Variance Decompositions in the Benchmark Model : SAARC
Years Global shock Regional shock Domestic shock
Bangladesh 2 22.51 32.63 44.86
12 23.15 33.14 43.72
Bhutan 2 0.39 18.51 81.11
12 1.32 18.51 80.17
Maldives 2 4.10 1.20 94.70
12 4.26 1.27 94.47
Nepal 2 16.82 21.55 61.63
12 19.08 21.17 59.75
Pakistan 2 2.32 11.97 85.71
12 2.45 14.21 83.34
Sri Lanka 2 12.95 14.01 73.04
12 13.81 13.92 72.27
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Table 9: Variance Decompositions in the Benchmark Model: EU
Years Global shock Regional shock Domestic shock
Austria 2 2.84 38.50 58.66
12 3.19 38.35 58.46
Belgium 2 10.73 20.97 68.30
12 10.83 21.07 68.11
Finland 2 10.33 8.49 81.18
12 10.49 23.39 66.11
France 2 12.79 28.42 58.79
12 15.08 28.32 56.61
Ireland 2 6.78 3.78 89.43
12 9.01 3.95 87.04
Italy 2 17.52 7.37 75.11
12 18.13 7.14 74.74
Luxembourg 2 12.84 19.93 67.23
12 14.14 20.04 65.82
Netherlands 2 14.32 21.04 64.64
12 15.24 21.37 63.39
Portugal 2 7.68 32.00 60.33
12 9.79 31.35 58.86
Spain 2 12.53 33.36 54.12
12 18.81 26.52 54.66
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Table 10: Variance Decompositions for Full Sample from 1970 to 2011: EU
Years Global shock Regional shock Domestic shock
Austria 2 12.04 46.38 41.58
12 13.37 45.96 40.67
Belgium 2 15.80 30.66 53.54
12 16.34 31.19 52.47
Finland 2 18.56 16.09 65.35
12 20.28 24.13 55.58
France 2 24.33 40.35 35.32
12 28.97 38.73 32.30
Ireland 2 36.05 5.86 58.09
12 42.16 6.17 51.67
Italy 2 20.76 26.66 52.58
12 22.75 27.04 50.21
Luxembourg 2 19.95 24.73 55.32
12 22.79 25.12 52.09
Netherlands 2 24.08 27.41 48.51
12 26.64 27.51 45.85
Portugal 2 17.37 37.76 44.87
12 23.12 34.33 42.55
Spain 2 30.47 22.95 46.58
12 43.46 17.10 39.44
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Table 11: Variance Decompositions in the Alternative Models: SAARC
Model(I) Model(II) Model(III)
Years GS RS DS GS RS DS GS RS DS
Bangaldesh 2 9.5 33.1 57.4 6.9 49.1 44.0 10.6 17.0 72.4
12 9.6 33.4 57.0 6.9 49.1 43.9 11.9 19.4 68.7
Bhutan 2 0.6 17.0 82.4 3.2 7.7 89.1 0.4 22.8 76.8
12 0.7 17.1 82.2 3.2 7.9 88.9 1.5 22.6 75.9
India 2 6.7 11.0 82.3 5.6 16.7 77.7 6.7 14.6 78.7
12 7.0 11.5 81.5 5.7 18.7 75.6 7.7 14.5 77.9
Maldives 2 2.9 9.0 88.1 3.1 2.3 94.6 3.5 9.8 86.8
12 3.1 9.1 87.8 3.3 2.5 94.2 3.6 9.8 86.6
Nepal 2 8.8 0.5 90.7 18.3 3.2 78.5 12.4 18.9 68.6
12 8.9 0.5 90.6 18.1 4.1 77.7 14.5 18.6 66.9
Pakistan 2 0.3 17.2 82.5 0.8 10.9 88.2 0.2 5.0 94.8
12 0.6 17.9 81.5 1.1 14.8 84.1 0.3 5.0 94.7
Sri Lanka 2 10.1 7.5 82.4 7.7 16.4 75.9 10.7 1.2 88.1
12 10.7 7.5 81.8 7.9 17.1 75.0 11.4 1.3 87.3
Note: GS denotes global shock, RS regional shock, and DS domestic shock.
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Table 12: Variance Decompositions in the Alternative Models: EU
Model(I) Model(II) Model(III)
Years GS RS DS GS RS DS GS RS DS
Austria 2 13.4 41.5 45.1 10.2 40.8 49.0 14.3 46.9 38.7
12 17.0 40.2 42.8 12.4 39.9 47.7 15.3 46.8 38.0
Belgium 2 25.0 20.5 54.5 15.5 22.4 62.1 20.6 36.3 43.2
12 25.5 21.1 53.4 16.0 22.7 61.3 20.8 36.7 42.5
Finalnd 2 14.9 4.2 80.9 16.6 4.1 79.3 18.8 14.3 66.9
12 15.3 4.3 80.5 16.3 8.3 75.4 18.4 18.9 62.7
France 2 37.3 37.7 25.1 25.6 27.3 47.1 29.7 50.3 20.0
12 38.4 37.0 24.6 27.2 27.1 45.7 32.1 48.3 19.6
Germany 2 26.2 3.9 69.9 12.6 1.7 85.7 10.3 2.4 87.2
12 26.2 4.6 69.2 12.8 2.0 85.2 10.6 2.5 86.9
Ireland 2 0.2 14.5 85.3 5.2 3.4 91.3 38.9 7.8 53.3
12 2.3 15.7 82.1 7.2 3.4 89.4 42.7 7.0 50.3
Italy 2 33.8 1.9 64.3 23.1 4.8 72.1 19.7 34.3 46.0
12 34.0 1.9 64.1 23.5 4.7 71.8 20.7 34.3 45.0
Luxemburg 2 32.3 12.1 55.6 18.2 21.3 60.6 10.3 42.4 47.3
12 33.4 12.3 54.3 19.5 21.1 59.4 12.7 41.6 45.7
Netherlands 2 19.7 9.8 70.6 20.5 9.1 70.4 25.3 23.2 51.5
12 22.0 9.6 68.3 21.7 9.1 69.2 26.5 23.4 50.1
Portugal 2 23.1 49.7 27.2 16.4 52.9 30.7 22.8 54.9 22.3
12 24.3 48.8 27.0 17.9 51.6 30.5 25.3 50.4 24.3
Spain 2 31.8 52.0 16.2 27.9 44.8 27.3 37.6 46.6 15.8
12 36.4 46.6 17.0 31.9 39.1 29.0 43.0 37.2 19.8
Note: GS denotes global shock, RS regional shock, and DS domestic shock.
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Table I: Unit Root Test
Country Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares Test
Bangladesh -3.77∗∗∗
Bhutan -3.89∗∗∗
India -5.40∗∗∗
Maldives -4.55∗∗∗
Nepal -4.89∗∗∗
Pakistan -2.22
Sri Lanka -3.00∗
Austria -3.79∗∗∗
Belgium -3.62∗∗
Finland -3.78∗∗∗
France -3.52∗∗
Germany -3.73∗∗
Ireland -2.45
Italy -4.95∗∗∗
Luxembourg -3.0
Netherlands -3.18∗
Portugal -3.82∗∗∗
Spain -2.52
US -4.52∗∗∗
Note: The test is conducted using three lags for all variables, using data
from 1970 to 1998 for European counties, and to 2011 for the rest. The
reported test results are for the first lag. The null hypothesis is that
variables have unit root. ∗ denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis
at the 10 percent significance level, ∗ ∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the five percent
and one percent significance levels respectively.
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Table II: Major Export Commodities
Country Principal Exports
Afghanistan opium, fruits and nuts, handwoven carpets, wool,
cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semiprecious gems
Bangladesh garments, knitwear, agricultural products,
frozen food (fish and seafood), jute and jute goods, leather
Bhutan electricity (to India), ferrosilicon, cement,
calcium carbide, copper wire, manganese, vegetable oil
India petroleum products, precious stones, machinery,
iron and steel, chemicals, vehicles, apparel
Maldives fish
Nepal clothing, pulses, carpets, textiles, juice,
pashima, jute goods
Pakistan textiles, rice, leather goods, sports goods,
chemicals, manufactures, carpets and rugs
Sri Lanka textiles and apparel, tea and spices; rubber
smanufactures; precious stones; coconut products, fish
Source: The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, US.
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Chapter 3
Extended Unemployment Insurance
and Job Search: Evidence from Time
Use Data
3.1 Introduction
The United States government extended the duration of unemployment insurance (UI) ben-
efits in several phases from mid-2008 to late 2009, raising the duration up to 99 weeks from
the regular 26 weeks. The extensions, billed as the most generous in U.S. history, were
targeted at financially helping job losers smooth their consumption in a period of severe
unemployment resulting from the Great Recession of 2007-09. However, the government’s
move to extend benefits stirred a debate over the disincentive effect on recipients’ labor
supply, which could contribute to a higher unemployment rate. For instance, in an op-ed,
Barro (2010) argues that in the absence of extended UI coverage, the U.S. unemployment
rate would have been 6.8 percent in June 2010, instead of the actual rate of 9.5 percent. On
the other hand, the administration has argued that UI extensions have had no impact on
46
the persistently high unemployment rate, which is viewed as caused by the severe downturn
and sluggish recovery associated with the Great Recession.
Establishing the causal link between the UI benefits extension and the unemployment
rate is inherently difficult because of the endogenous nature of the insurance program. In
theory, the disincentive effect of an expansion in UI benefits impacts the unemployment rate
through two direct channels: discouraging job search behavior of unemployed individuals
and increasing their reservation wage (i.e., decreasing their job-acceptance rate). Indirectly,
there are at least four additional channels through which extended UI benefits could affect
the unemployment rate both in the short run and long run. First, the coverage can increase
consumption of goods and services, thus edging up overall output and the employment rate
in the short run. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that one dollar spent
on extended UI benefits can create a multiplier effect of $1.10 in the economy. Second, it
entails “crowd-out” effect in the short run, which is the effect of the receipt of UI benefits by
a family member on the labor supply by other family members. Cullen and Gruber (2000)
find that wives’ hours of labor supply could go up by about 30 percent during the period
of their husbands’ unemployment if the latter did not have access to UI benefits. Likewise,
in the long run, unemployment insurance could help better match workers and firms, thus
increasing output and, consequently, employment in the economy (Acemoglu and Shimer
2000). With benefits, an unemployed individual could afford to search and wait for a better-
suited, higher-paid and higher-productivity job. Finally, the disincentive effect of UI benefits
may lengthen the duration of unemployment, deteriorating their skills for future jobs, thus
decreasing productivity in the economy and increasing unemployment in the long run.
The direct and indirect disincentive effects require a general equilibrium analysis to
quantify the link between the UI program and unemployment rate as well as unemployment
spells. Therefore, in an empirical investigation of the unemployment insurance program,
evaluating its effect on the key variables such as job search and reservation wage, seems to
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be more reasonable strategy. Yet there is a paucity of research studying the effects of recent
UI extensions on the two key variables. Krueger and Mueller (2010) study the effect of
regular UI benefits on job search intensity of unemployed individuals in the U.S. from 2003
to 2007. One of their findings is that the generosity of unemployment insurance negatively
impacts job search activity among the unemployed (estimated elasticities range from -1.6 to
- 2.2). Econometric methodology and research question in this paper differ somewhat from
Krueger and Mueller (2010). Particularly, in this paper I attempt to estimate the causal
effect of the expansions in UI coverage during the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and its
aftermath, on job search behavior of the unemployed.
In line with the labor supply literature, I focus on the effects on women and men
separately. Women’s labor supply is considered to be more elastic than men’s. For example,
Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis (2011) argue for gender-based taxation because men are
less responsive to market wages and compensation. They argue that because of historical,
social and cultural reasons, men derive more utility from participating in the labor market
even while market compensation is low. However, it is socially acceptable for women to fully
engage in home production. The intuition of Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis (2011) is
equally valid in the UI system. Unemployment benefits could induce women to abandon the
labor market in favor of home production.
This paper’s objective is to focus on just one “channel,” where UI extension can be
treated as plausibly exogenous. In my research design, I assume that eligibility for UI is not
affected by search activity. I use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data, as it provides
information about job search activities of unemployed individuals. This paper’s identification
strategy uses unemployed persons eligible for UI benefits as a treatment group and those
ineligible as a control group (e.g., Farber and Valletta, 2013; Rothstein, 2011; Krueger and
Mueller, 2010). I use two supplementary empirical approaches to investigate the disincentive
effect of extended UI benefits. I first estimate the effect of the weekly average UI benefits
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on job search intensity (an amount of time spent on job search activities on a given diary
day) for the eligible group relative to the ineligible group by year from April 2004 to 2011.
My goal is to assess whether the average dollar amount of the weekly UI benefits affect the
job search intensity differently in the post-extension period.
Second, I employ the difference-in-differences (DD) method, since the extensions in
2008-2009 could be treated as a natural experiment or pseudo-experiment. Before proceeding
to the actual estimation, I test if the control group could serve as a true counterfactual, so
that the proposed DD methodology is a statistically valid approach. The post-treatment
sample consists of the period 2010-2011. Even though the UI extension began in June
2008, Congress successively revised and introduced new tiers of extensions with different
features and benefits until November 2009 (see Section II for details). More importantly,
the extensions were still intact through 2010 and 2011 (and continued into 2013, albeit with
some changes made in 2012). At the time of writing, the latest year of data available from
the ATUS is 2011. I choose the period before June 2008, specifically from April 2004 to May
2008, as the pre-treatment period. Prior to March 2004, another moderately extended UI
coverage–Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TUEC)–was in effect. As UI
coverage was extended during recessions in the past, the unemployed might have anticipated
an extension in UI coverage, especially after the beginning of recession (December 2007)
and might subsequently have reduced job search efforts. To overcome this anticipation
effect, I also estimate models using pre-treatment period only until December 2007. It is
worth mentioning that even though the potential duration of benefits has been extended,
the replacement rate (ratio of the UI benefits relative to previous earnings) has been left
unchanged. Therefore, the recipient received the weekly dollar amount of the extended
benefits equal to the regular benefit amount.
To preview the results, I find women are more responsive to the extended UI benefits
(the effect for women is negative and statistically significant) than men. The average effect
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of the extensions of UI coverage on job search behavior of unemployed women is over a
10 percentage point decline in the probability of job search. I find that the probability of
unemployed men searching for a job decreases by one percentage point; however, it is not
statistically significant. I apply a placebo test to check whether the model is capturing actual
treatment effects, not the pre-existing differential trends between treatment and comparison
units.
This paper is related to the literature empirically investigating the disincentive effect
of UI benefits. The majority of the literature that is focused on the effect of UI benefits
on unemployment durations or exits (e.g., Katz and Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1990; Card and
Levine, 2000; Jurajda and Tannery, 2003) shows a wide range of disincentive effects. Fur-
thermore, this paper complements a strand of the literature that looks at the disincentive
effect of extended benefits associated with the Great Recession on unemployment rates.
Rothstein (2011), along with examining the effect of UI extensions on unemployment exits
and durations, investigates the effect on the unemployment rate, and finds a small effect of
about a 0.1 to 0.5 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. Farber and Valletta
(2013) apply a similar approach to Rothstein (2011), and their estimates show a statistically
significant and small increase in unemployment duration, and around a 0.4 percentage point
rise in the unemployment rate. Fujita (2011) and Mazumder (2011) employ a simulation
approach, based on the estimated parameters in the previous research, to measure the disin-
centive effect of UI on unemployment rates. They find that extended UI benefits contributed
to around a 0.8 to 1.2 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. Using a struc-
tural calibrated model, Nakajima (2012) finds that UI extensions of 2008-2009 caused the
unemployment rate to increase by 1.4 percentage points, accounting for about 29 percent
of the total unemployment rate increase in the US between 2005-2007 and 2009-2011. This
paper contributes to this literature by looking at the effect of extended UI benefits on job
search behavior, a key variable affected by the UI program.
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This paper is also related to a growing literature studying the job search effort of the
unemployed. Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis (2013), who study how individuals utilize
their lost work hours during the recent recession in the U.S., find that around two to six
percent of the lost market work hours were devoted to job search. Likewise, DeLoach and
Kurt (2013), Gomme and Lkhagvasuren (2013), and Mukoyama, Patterson and Sahin (2014)
study the job search behavior over the business cycles using the ATUS data. Though not a
primary objective of this paper, its results have implications for understanding the prediction
of the standard search and matching model. For instance, Shimer (2005) finds that the
textbook search and matching model is unable to account for the observed volatility of the
labor market tightness, defined as the vacancy to unemployment ratio. The volatility might
be affected by fluctuations in job search behavior over the business cycle due to changes
in generosity of unemployment benefits. Note that the U.S. government has historically
extended the unemployment insurance during periods of economic downturn.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II offers a brief description of
the unemployment insurance system in the U.S. Section III describes data and presents basic
estimates. I design a difference-in-differences specification in Section IV. Section V presents
results, and Section VI includes placebo tests and further robustness checks. Section VII
presents its conclusions.
3.2 Background on Unemployment Insurance Exten-
sions
Established under the Social Security Act of 1935 as a joint federal-state program, the
unemployment insurance (UI) system provides temporary financial support to workers who
lose lobs. The UI aims to ease financial hardships of the unemployed and facilitate their job
search behavior. Normally, states set the parameters of the regular UI benefits, including the
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maximum and minimum amount of the benefits, the potential duration of the benefits, and
eligibility criteria. The duration of availability is typically 26 weeks in most states1 during
normal economic periods. The weekly benefit amount varies from state to sate. In 2011, an
average worker received around $300 a week nationwide, replacing almost half of his or her
previous earnings. To receive benefits, workers must lose their job through no fault of their
own, must have a certain amount of previous earnings, and must actively search for work.
Generally, new entrants and re-entrants into the labor force as well as those who voluntarily
leave jobs or are fired for a cause like misconduct are not eligible for the benefits. According
to Krueger and Meyer (2002), about 40 percent of all unemployed individuals (both eligible
and ineligible) qualify for and receive UI benefits.
One important aspect of the U.S. unemployment insurance system is that the gov-
ernment has historically extended the duration of UI benefits during periods of economic
downturn through two channels. Since 1970, Extended Benefits (EB), a joint federal-state
program, has provided an additional 13 and 20 weeks of benefits in states exceeding the
unemployment rate of 6.5 percent and 8 percent, respectively. On top of that, the federal
government has extended the duration of UI coverage on a temporary basis to the unem-
ployed during recessions or periods of severe unemployment. So far Congress has activated
such temporary programs eight times - 1958, 1961, 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002, and 2008
(see Whittaker and Isaacs, 2013).
As part of its response to severe unemployment brought about by the Great Recession,
Congress enacted the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program in June
2008 (see Appendix Table A1). In the beginning, the EUC offered an additional 13 weeks
of benefits to the unemployed who exhausted their regular benefits. Congress expanded the
duration of EUC benefits in successive phases until November 2009, increasing the duration
of the benefits under the EUC up to 53 weeks. There are four tiers of EUC. EUC Tiers
1In Missouri and South Carolina, regular UI benefits are available for 20 weeks, and in Arkansas for 25
weeks (see “Council of Economic Advisors”).
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I and II offer an additional 20-weeks and 14-weeks of compensation for the unemployed in
all states irrespective of unemployment rates. However, the remaining two tiers are based
on unemployment rates. EUC Tier III provides benefits for a further 13 weeks in states
where the unemployment rate exceeds six percent. EUC Tier IV is implemented in states
exceeding 8.5 percent unemployment and offers an additional six weeks of benefits. In total,
an unemployed individual in 2010 and 2011 was able to receive UI benefits as long as 99
weeks (26 weeks under the standard UI, 20 weeks under the EB and 53 weeks under the
EUC). These unprecedented extensions have been called the most generous in U.S. history
(e.g., Barro, 2010).
3.3 Data and Basic Estimates
This paper draws its main data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) as it is the only
nationally representative survey that contains information about job search activity. This
information enables me to directly investigate the effect of unemployment insurance on job
search behavior. The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the ATUS, which is sponsored by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The ATUS selects respondents from the outgoing sample of the
Current Population Survey (CPS). Individuals aged 16 or above are surveyed in the ATUS,
two to five months after their final CPS interview; about 71 percent after three months.
Individuals are asked to report their detailed activities on the basis of their previous day’s
time use diary. One of the several activities reported in the ATUS is the amount of time spent
on job search. Job search includes making contacts to employers, looking at and responding
to job advertisements, filling out applications, and traveling to job interviews. A complete
list of activities used as job search in this paper are given in Table A2 in Appendix B.
I limit the data to unemployed individuals between ages 25 to 64 years in the main
estimations since this group has a strong participation in, and inclination toward, the labor
53
market.2 This paper’s choice of a lower-bound age restriction follows Blau and Kahn (2007),
and Cullen and Gruber (2000), in order to avoid complications related to choices of schooling
versus market work by young people. According to Mulligans (2012), more than 75 percent of
unemployed youths between ages of 16 to 24 years do not receive UI benefits. Upon reaching
65, an individual’s labor market behavior may change due to eligibility for social security
and medicare benefits. I use data from April 2004 to 2011. The ATUS began collecting data
in 2003. Its 2003 survey consists of around 20,000 respondents. Since 2004, the number of
respondents has decreased to approximately 13,000 each year. The sample (which excludes
individuals who are employed, are out of the labor force or aged below 25 and above 64)
includes 3,259 unemployed persons. The data are repeated cross-sections.
The definition of an unemployed person in the ATUS is the same as in the CPS.
The definition includes those aged 16 years and older who are unemployed, but available for
work in the reference week and who have actively been searching for work in the past four
weeks. Search rule is exempted for those individuals who are expecting to be recalled to
a job. (These individuals are still considered unemployed even if they have not looked for
work in the past four weeks prior to the survey.)
The ATUS does not contain any explicit information about eligibility and ineligibility
for UI benefits, nor does it have any information on whether eligible individuals indeed
claim the benefits. However, the data contain information about individuals’ reasons for
unemployment. Using these reasons for unemployment, I follow the classification strategy
of Krueger and Mueller (2010) to infer an individuals’ eligibility for UI benefits. In recent
years, this strategy of classification has become popular in the literature (e.g., Farber and
Valletta, 2013; Rothstein, 2011). I first divide unemployed persons into four categories: i)
job losers, ii) those expecting a recall from their previous employer, iii) voluntary job leavers,
and iv) new entrants and re-entrants into the labor force. Then, I categorize: i) job losers
as well as ii) those expecting a recall from the previous employer as eligible for UI benefits,
2Nonetheless I separately estimate effects of the UI extensions for youths between ages of 16 to 24 years.
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and iii) voluntary job leavers as well as iv) re- or new entrants into the labor force as the
ineligible group. More specifically, each category is defined in the following way:
(i) Job losers: This category includes persons who reported in the CPS interview that
they were on layoff, or that they had become unemployed due to the ending of a
temporary job, and are still unemployed in the ATUS interview. It also includes those
who reported in the CPS that they are employed, but are unemployed in the ATUS
interview. It could be recalled that CPS data were collected two to five months prior
to the ATUS.
(ii) Expecting a recall: This category consists of unemployed persons who indicate in the
ATUS interview that they are expecting a recall for work from their previous employer.
(iii) Voluntary job leavers: This category includes those who reported in the CPS that they
quit their job, and are unemployed in the ATUS. It is worth mentioning that the ATUS
questionnaire does not include any information about job quitters, so I turn to the CPS
data to identify them.
(iv) Re- and new entrants: This category includes those persons who reported in the CPS
that they are out of the labor force, but who are unemployed at the time of the ATUS
interview. It also includes those who reported in the CPS interview that they are re-
entrants or new entrants in the labor force and are still unemployed at the time of the
ATUS.
Presumably, my classification strategy has some flaws since I am unable to observe if
eligible persons actually receive UI benefits. One of the flaws in my classification is related
to re- and new entrants into the labor force. In my classification strategy, those who are re-
and new entrants or those who are out of the labor force at the time of the CPS interview
but are unemployed in the ATUS interview are categorized as ineligible. However, it is
possible for some of them to have found a job and become unemployed again during the
period between the CPS and ATUS interviews. So, it is possible for me to classify a person
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as ineligible on the basis of the CPS data where he/she in fact became eligible in the months
between the CPS and ATUS survey. However, I could not verify this possibility in the ATUS
data. This classification error is expected to create a downward bias in the estimation of the
parameter of my interest, thus underestimating the true effect of UI extensions. Likewise, I
am unable to observe if eligible individuals actually receive benefits. Those unemployed who
are not actually collecting unemployment benefits might have a higher participation rate in
job search (if the theory that UI benefits discourage job search is to be believed). Excluding
them from the eligible group decreases the overall mean of job search of that group, which in
turn increases absolute magnitude of UI effect. To sum up, these errors are likely to create
a downward bias in my estimates.
A. Preliminary Analytics
In this subsection, I attempt to calculate both the probability and intensity of job search
across groups before and after the extensions of UI benefits, using the data from April 2004
to May 2008, and 2010 to 2011. Table 1 contains job search participation rates in pre- and
post-treatment periods across treatment and control groups. I define the participation rate
(i.e., the probability of participation) as the share of unemployed individuals in the sample
who spend time in job search on the surveyed day.
The calculations in Table 3, which are DD estimates without any control variables,
show that UI coverage expansions decreases the job search probability of the unemployed
women eligible for UI benefits by around seven percentage points, relative to those ineligible
women. Likewise, the average effect of UI extensions for men is around a three percentage
points decline in the probability of job search. If the treatment (the extensions of UI coverage)
were completely random, this estimate would be the implied causal effect. However, the
estimates might be driven by observed or unobserved individual characteristics, instead of
being the effect of the extended UI coverage. I then attempt to understand if there is any
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change in the composition of the control group between pre- and post-treatment periods, to
raise the group’s job search outcome in a larger proportion than that of the treatment group.
For this purpose, I look at the observed characteristics between the pre- and post-treatment
period. Table 2 contains observed characteristics of each group before and after the treatment
(Panel A for women and Panel B for men). The characteristics of each group mostly seem
similar between pre- and post-treatment periods. The only noticeable changes are a shift
to more educated/experienced women in the treatment group after the recession. But, the
big shift in job search is for the control group, not the treatment group. Nonetheless, we
cannot deny a possibility that unobserved characteristics might be different between pre- and
post-treatment periods, but we cannot verify it. (In this event, the conditional independence
assumption could be violated.)
On the other hand, it could be argued that as the job arrival rate is lower during
the period of economic slack (the post-treatment period), both groups are required to put
extra search efforts to achieve the same level of success as in the normal economic times (pre-
treatment period). Hence, those ineligible for unemployment benefits sped up their efforts in
the post-treatment period, while those eligible did not speed up due to the generous benefits.
This might have led to a slower growth of job search by the treatment group.
Table 3 presents the probabilities of job search over the subgroups of unemployed
individuals across gender on a given diary day before and after the UI expansions. On
average, around 16 percent of the total unemployed women engaged in job search (i.e., had
greater than zero-minute job search) before the extensions of UI coverage, in comparison
to 22 percent after the extensions. In all sub-categories, the participation of women in
job search in the post-extension period is higher than pre-extension period. Likewise, the
proportion of unemployed men engaging in job search was 28 percent after the extensions,
up from 26 percent before the extensions. Among the sub-categories of unemployed men, all
except Hispanic and other groups have a higher proportion of job-search in the post-extension
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period than the pre-extension period.
Table 4 reports job search intensity (i.e., the total amount of time an individual
spends looking for a job on a given diary day). Except quitters, there has been an increase
in job search activity for women by their types of unemployment and race in the post-
extension period as compared to the pre-extension period. Among unemployed men, quitters,
Hispanic and those in the category of other race has decreased job-search intensity in the
post-treatment period.
Overall, these preliminary analytics show that job search activity has mostly increased
across groups, including treatment and control groups, in the post-treatment period as com-
pared to the pre-treatment period. Furthermore, those eligible for UI benefits had higher
probability and intensity of job search in the pre-treatment period, in comparison to those
ineligible. However, growths in both the probability and intensity of job search between pre-
and post-extension periods for the eligible group were considerably slower than that of the
ineligible group.
3.4 Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Job Search
Probability
My goal in this section is to assess the effect of UI extensions on job search behavior during the
Great Recession and its aftermath. As the extensions could be seen as a pseudo-experiment,
I apply a difference-in-differences (DD) regression, which is very popular in the literature
to measure the policy effect or intervention. I use the period from March 2004 to May
2008 as the pre-treatment period and 2010-2011 as the post-treatment period. One of the
major issues in DD analysis is whether the control units in a study can truly serve as
the counterfactual of the treatment units. If there are systematic differences between the
comparison and treatment units, the estimates from the DD approach may reflect results of
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their differences, not the policy effect (treatment). This is true even if the unconfoundedness
assumption still holds in the regression. One indirect way of testing such a systematic
difference is to test if there is a sufficient overlap in the covariates between treatment and
control units. For this purpose, one may think of an conventional approach which is to use
a t-test:
t = X¯1−X¯0√
S20
N0
+
S21
N1
. (3)
However, the major drawback with this test is that it is very sensitive to sample size,
and it tends to over-reject the null hypothesis when the sample size increases. To address
this limitation, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest using a normalized difference (which
is also scale-invariant), where the difference is:
∆X = X¯1−X¯0√
S20+S
2
1
. (4)
The authors also suggest that researchers can use the threshold of one-quarter normal-
ized difference as a rule of thumb. Exceeding this specified threshold implies that covariates
are different between control and treatment units. In Tables 5 and 6, I report normalized
differences for each individual-specific covariates used in the DD model for women and men
respectively. The differences are calculated for the control and treatment groups during
pre- and post-treatment periods, separately. Almost all of the differences are less than one-
quarter. (For women, only one variable–a dummy variable for the white–is slightly higher
than one-quarter, and for men, age variables slightly exceed this threshold.) Overall, this
suggests that individual characteristics are not systematically different by the treatment sta-
tus. Therefore, the difference-in-differences estimator could be seen as a plausible empirical
strategy.
As many respondents in the sample are not participating in job search (i.e., they have
zero-search) on a given diary day, I am interested in looking at the impact of the UI benefits
on the probability of their decision to participate in the job search activity. (In an alternative
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specification and robustness check later, I actually look at the effect on job search intensity
using the DD method in the form of equation [5] below.) It is important to note that the
probability of job search in this paper could be viewed as the probability of sampling an
individual who spends a positive amount of time in job search activities. It is true that to
be counted as unemployed in the CPS data, an individual should have at least one active
job search in the last four weeks preceding the surveyed date. Note that respondents in
the ATUS data are drawn from the CPS’s respondents, and the ATUS follows the CPS’s
definition of unemployment. In the CPS (and the ATUS), active job search refers to an
activity which could land an individual on a job without any additional work. Otherwise,
an activity is called passive, which is not enough for an individual to be categorized as an
unemployed. For example, looking at an ad on newspaper is a passive activity. However, in
the definition of job search in this paper, both active and passive activities are included. I
have listed a complete list of job search activities in Appendix A.
One of the shortcomings of time diary data is that we can observe a respondent’s
activities only on a particular day. Hence, it is possible that the respondent might have
spent time looking for a job on other days. Nonetheless, sampling an individual with positive
amount of time devoted to job search could be a close proxy to the job search probability of
the individual. The intensity with which a job seeker pursues a position should be positively
correlated with the probability to have a positive amount of job search on a random day
of the survey. For instance, if an individual has only one active job search in the past four
weeks, and is categorized as unemployed, it is very likely that we observe zero job search
probability on the surveyed day. On a given surveyed day, around 18.38 percent unemployed
women have greater than zero job search activities (i.e., around 81.62 have zero job search).
Likewise, around 26.94 percent unemployed men have greater than zero job search activities.
Table 3 contains further details on how many respondents have job search activities greater
than zero on a diary day, by the type of unemployment before and after the treatment. Note
that the probability of the participation represents the share of unemployed individuals in
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the sample who have a greater than zero job search on a given diary day.
One advantage of using the binary dependent variable (probability of job search
instead of job search intensity) is that it is less prone to measurement error. The reason is
that it is easier for individuals to remember whether they looked for a job on a given diary
day, rather than recalling the amount of time they spent looking for a job. Specifically, I
estimate the logit DD model below on repeated cross-sectional data to measure the causal
effects of UI extensions on job search decision.
Pr[yi(t,s) = 1|Postt, T reati, xi(t,s)] =
Λ[α + β1Postt + β2Treati + δPostt ∗ Treati + λTrendt + θ′xi(t,s)
+γ3AWBs + γ1un rates + γ2un duri + γ5l̂n(w)i(t,s) + γ4stateresids], (5)
where i = 1, 2, 3, ...N denotes individuals, and s represents state. The outcome
variable, yi(t,s), is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an individual participates in job search;
otherwise 0. Λ(.) is the logistic cumulative distribution function. The variable Postt is a
dichotomous variable which equals 1 if it is the post-extension period. The variable Treati
is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if an individual is eligible for UI benefits. The variable
Postt∗Treati is the variable of interest (its coefficient is the treatment effect). The treatment
and control groups have the same linear time trend. (In a later robustness check, instead
of time trend I use a year fixed-effect model, and also use a quadratic time trend.) xi(t,s)
is a vector of individual characteristics, including age, age-squared, level of education, race,
sex, presence of child in house, and marital status.3 The variable AWBs is average weekly
UI benefits (which represents the average dollar amount of benefits received by a recipient
per week, calculated by month and state).4 I also include other control variables described
3The variable partner represents martial status, which includes both the married and individuals cohab-
iting with a partner as a non-reference group.
4I collect average weekly unemployment benefits from Department of Labor Employment and Training
Administration ( http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/claimssum.asp).
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below.
The unemployment rate (un rates): One of the major factors that might influence
an individual’s job search behavior is a perception about the macroeconomic environment.
Unemployed individuals may not look for jobs during a period of severe unemployment if
they perceive that jobs may not be available and that the marginal cost of job search will
be higher than the expected payoff. Conversely, it could be argued that an individual needs
to put extra time and effort to find a job in a period of mass unemployment due to a decline
in jobs arrival rate. And, the literature is not conclusive about the cyclical property of
job search behavior. DeLoach and Kurt (2013), and Gomme and Lkhagvasuren (2013) find
job search behavior to be pro-cyclical (unemployed decrease search efforts during the labor
market slack), while Mukoyama, Patterson and Sahin (2014) shows that the aggregate job
search effort is countercyclical. To capture the potential change in an individual’s job search
behavior, I control for the monthly unemployment rate by state.5 In the ATUS data, I can
observe the month of interview of the respondents, so I am able to match the interview
month with the monthly unemployment rate.
The unemployment duration (un duri): The canonical model of Mortensen (1977)
predicts that unemployed individuals ineligible for UI benefits put constant effort toward
job search irrespective of their unemployment duration, while eligible ones speed up their
search effort when their benefits are about to expire. Therefore, controlling for unemployment
duration is essential. However, the ATUS data do not include the unemployment duration of
individuals. As in Krueger and Mueller (2010), I use the duration reported by unemployed
individuals in the CPS interviews. I then add the number of weeks between their CPS and
ATUS interview to the duration reported in the CPS. However, for the respondents who are
not unemployed in the CPS interview but are in the ATUS, I am not able to observe their
duration. Therefore, I impute a proxy duration for them, which is half of the weeks between
5I compile monthly state unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data can be
downloaded at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/laus_nr.htm#2003.
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the CPS and ATUS interviews.
Potential wage (l̂n(w)i(t,s)): Potential wage is believed to influence an unemployed
individual’s behavior. For those unemployed persons who expect a higher wage in the labor
market, unemployment benefits might have minimal effects as their opportunity cost of
staying unemployed would be high. For the low earnings group, the weekly benefits can
replace a significant portion of their potential earnings, encouraging them to substitute their
labor with leisure. However, the data do not contain information about previous earnings
of the unemployed, even if they have work history. To deal with this wage issue, I estimate
a predicted wage for each individual. First I use the Current Population Survey’s (CPS)
Outgoing Rotation Group data and estimate the following state-fixed effect model separately
for each year 6 for log-wage:
log(wi,s) = %+ υx′i,s + dummys + i,s, (2)
where xis is a vector of individual characteristics, which include the level of education, age,
age-squared, gender, marital status, and presence of children. I also use state dummies.
Then, on the basis of estimated parameters from equation (2) for a particular year, I predict
expected log-wage for each respondent in the ATUS for that year.7
Distribution of the potential wage offer (stateresids) : Another determinant of job
search is the potential wage offer distribution. The rationale behind this is that the more
dispersed the distribution is, the more time individuals spend looking for a job as they try
to get the best possible wage. As a proxy for the potential wage-offer distribution, I use
residual wage dispersion calculated as the standard deviation of the residual (i,s) from wage
6I use the Central for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) version of the CPS data. This data adjusts
for over-time earnings, tips and commissions. Output results from this estimation are omitted due to space
constraints.
7Because each year I run a separate regression, the number of observations vary by the year. In 2004, the
number of observations is 108,752. The number includes 108,228 in 2005, 107,085 in 2006, 106,314 in 2007,
104,910 in 2008, 139,326 in 2010, and 137,828 in 2011.
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equation (2) for each state and year (see Krueger and Mueller, 2010).
For the non-linear DD model, the interpretation of the policy parameter, δ, is different
from the case of a linear regression. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) equals
the differences in the two cross differences ( e.g., Eissa and Liebman 1996, Puhani 2012).
Let τ be the effect:
τ = Λ[α + β1Postt + β2Treati + δPostt ∗ Treati + γ1Trendt + Z ′i(t,s)θ]
−Λ[α + β1Postt + β2Treati + γ1Trendt + Z ′i(t,s)θ], (6)
where Zi(t,s) is a vector of all control variables used in regression (5). Bertrand, Duflo and
Mullainathan (2004) show that the conventional DD standard errors are severely understated
due to serial correlation. As suggested by the authors to correct for possible serial correlation,
I calculate the variance-covariance matrix of errors, clustering at the state level, from the
regression of equation (5).8 Then, I apply the Delta Method to calculate standard errors for
estimates.
3.5 Results
In this section I present results from a variety of specifications of difference-in-differences
(DD) estimation based on equation (5) to explore the causal effect of the recent UI extensions
on job search behavior across gender. The focus of this paper on gender differences in the
impact of the extensions in UI benefits is in line with the labor supply literature.
I estimate four-baseline nonlinear DD models for men and women separately; the
results are presented in Table 7 and 8. The first three models include same control group,
8Indeed, clustered standard errors in this paper are slightly higher than the conventional robust standard
errors, supporting Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan’s (2004) argument.
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but slightly different treatment groups. The first model consists of the full sample (all
individuals eligible for UI benefits as treatment group). In the second and third models I
attempt to exclude those eligible unemployed persons, who are perceived to have exhausted
their UI coverage. In the pre-treatment period, UI benefits were usually available for 26
weeks. Therefore, I exclude those eligible individuals having the duration of unemployment
more than 26 weeks in the pre-treatment time (from the treatment group). In the second
model, I exclude all individuals who are unemployed more than 99 weeks in 2010 and 2011
(from the treatment group), as they were eligible for UI benefits up to 99 weeks. In the
third model, I exclude all eligible individuals who are unemployed more than 60 weeks in
the post-treatment period (for the reasons explained in the earlier Section).
In model 4, I exclude those unemployed persons who are on temporary layoff and
expecting a recall from their previous employer (from both the control and treatment group),
and those who voluntarily left the job (from the control group). It is expected that these
people behave quite differently from the average labor market participant. The sample then
consists of individuals who are on layoff through no fault of their own as eligible (treatment)
group, and re- or new entrants in the labor force as ineligible (control) group.
In all these models, I find consistently close results (Table 7) for women. I get
positive and significant effect of the eligibility status (i.e. the variable eligible) on job search
behavior. One of the potential reasons for having higher job search probability for eligible
group could be the requirement of job search to collect UI benefits. And, it is possible that
eligible individuals might have kept up looking for a job; however, they might have refused to
take up job offers, increasing reservation wage and extending the duration of unemployment
(another disincentive effect of UI benefits which I do not explore here). Another possibility
for the higher probability of job search by the eligible group than the ineligible group could
be the result of the initial differences in job search behavior. It could be noted that the
eligible group mostly consists of those who are laid off from work, and the ineligible group
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consists of re- or new entrants in the labor force. Arguably, a layoff can be considered as a
shock to the worker. In light of the shock, the laid-off worker could be in greater need of
a job to smooth or maintain consumption than that of a re- or new entrant who can have
a relatively longer period to adjust for consumption. Nonetheless, this variable does not
represent the effect of UI extensions.
The interaction term between eligibility and post-treatment period (referred as Treati×
Postt) is the variable of interest as its coefficient is the implied causal effect of treatment
(extensions of UI benefits). In the technical language of program evaluation, the coefficient
is termed as average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The average effect of the UI
extensions in 2010 and 2011 is over 10 percentage points decline in the probability that an
eligible unemployed woman searches a job. It is statistically significant at the five percent
level in the first and third model, and at the one percent level in the second and fourth
models. This represents around a 56 percent of the average predicted probability of job
search (i.e., the ratio of the effect to ¯ˆp). I find around a one percentage point decline in the
probability of job search for men (Table 8). However, it is not statistically significant.
A. The Effect of UI Extension on Youths
In this subsection, I attempt to evaluate the effect of UI extensions on youths between ages
of 16 to 24 years by gender. Unemployment benefits are expected to have very minimal
impact on this group’s labor market decision, since over 75 percent of unemployed youths do
not receive unemployment benefits (see Mulligans 2012). First, most youths either enroll in
schools and colleges, or are planning to enroll. Second, many might not have sufficient work
history to be eligible for UI benefits. Third, as they are in the early phases of their career,
finding a job and gaining work experience could be a priority, instead of being dependent on
the social safety net. As expected, the effects are not statistically different from zero.9
9To save some space, I do not report the results and are available upon request.
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B. Anticipation Effects
It is worth considering if the results are clouded by anticipation effects. Historically, un-
employment benefits have been extended during recessions. With the advent of the Great
Recession in December 2007, the unemployed individuals eligible for UI coverage might have
anticipated the extension of UI benefits in the near future. Thus, I attempt to take an-
ticipation effects into account. I exclude 2008-data from the pre-treatment period (include
only from March 2004 to 2007), and estimate the two models for women.10 The first re-
gression includes the full sample, while the second excludes those individuals expecting a
recall from their previous employer, quitters, and those eligible individuals who are supposed
to have exhausted UI benefits (those having remained unemployed more than 26 weeks in
pre-treatment period and 60 weeks in the post-treatment period). Table 9 reports the re-
sults. I find consistently close results to the baseline specification. The average effect of
the UI extensions is a decline of job search in the range of 10 to 13 percentage points, and
statistically significant at the five percent level in the first model, and at the one percent
level in the second model.
3.6 Robustness Check
A. Placebo Test
I apply two placebo tests to further explore if the results are robust, not spurious, and to
justify the validity of difference-in-differences (DD) methodology in this paper. One of the
most important assumption in DD regression is a common trend (i.e. in the absence of
treatment, the treatment group would evolve in the similar fashion as control group). The
placebo tests complement the normalized-differences test used in Section IV to gauge the
10I do not report estimation for men as I do not find statistically significant effects on the baseline speci-
fication for them.
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common trend assumption. If the results in the baseline model were not the true policy effect,
rather the reflection of the underlying structural differences between treatment and control
units, I should expect statistically significant estimates in the model with only pre-treatment
period data.
I carry out two placebo tests using the data from the pre-treatment period. First, I
use all pre-treatment data from April 2004 to May 2008, during which no federal emergency
unemployment compensation program was introduced. I divide the data into two periods
(from April 2004 to 2005 as the pre-treatment period, and from 2006 to May 2008 as the post-
treatment period). Second, I extend the placebo test by changing the treatment periods. I
use data from April 2004 to 2005 as the pre-treatment period, and 2006 and 2007 as the post-
treatment period, excluding 2008. I run the logit difference-in-differences regression with
the same specification as in equation (5). Unemployed individuals eligible for UI benefits
represent the treatment group, and ineligible individuals are the control group, the same
definition as in the main baseline DD model. My variable of interest is the interaction
between the variables eligibility and post-treatment period (denoted as Treati×Postt), as
in the baseline model.
I run two regressions for each placebo test. First regression includes the full sample.
Second regression excludes those who are supposed to exhaust UI benefits from the treatment
group (those unemployed longer than 26 weeks), those expecting a recall from the past
employer, and quitters. Results from the placebo tests are reported in Table 10 for women. (I
do not report results for men as I do not find any effect in the main estimations.) The variable
of interest (Treati × Postt) is not statistically different from zero in both specifications. To
save space, I do not include estimates of controlled variables. To sum up, the placebo tests
further validate the findings for the effects of UI extensions on the probability of job search
in the baseline DD regression.
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B. Effect on Job Search Intensity
In this subsection, I attempt to measure the effect of UI extensions in terms of job search
intensity. First, I run the ordinary least squares (OLS) model for equation (5) (linear DD
regression) with the amount of job search as the dependent variable. I exclude those who are
expecting a recall from their past work, quitters, and those who are supposed to use up their
UI benefits (those having remained unemployed more than 26 weeks in the pre-treatment
period and 60 weeks in the post-treatment period). Table 11 reports results. The average
effect is around 30 minutes decline in job search intensity on a given diary day. The estimate
is significant at the five percent level without clustering. With clustering, the estimate is
significant at the 10 percent level.
Additionally, I employ a Tobit difference-in-differences model, as job search intensity
is highly skewed because most respondents in the survey have zero search (almost 80 per-
cent). The OLS method does not work in extremely skewed data due to the violation of
the normality assumption. Table 11 shows results from the Tobit difference-in-differences
model. The model is left-censored (censored below zero). I find a negative and statistically
significant (at the five percent level) effect.
C. Further Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection I provide results from additional robustness exercises (see Table 12). First,
I estimate a logit difference-in-differences regression using year fixed-effects instead of time
trend. I normalize 2004 and the first year of the post-treatment period 2010 to zero to
avoid the dummy variable trap. Second, I allow for quadratic time-effect. Third, I exclude
unemployed women aged 55 and above from the data and estimate the model, to ensure
that results are not driven by matters related to retirement. It is expected that those people
who are close to retirement react to the labor market differently. As reported in Table 12,
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all results from these alternative specifications are close to those from the preferred baseline
specification.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) extensions on job
search, using data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). The government made
successive decisions about the extensions of UI coverage from June 2008 to November 2009,
raising the duration of benefits to as many as 99 weeks. The extensions that are termed as
the most generous in history were continued into 2011. In the research design of this paper,
I use unemployed persons eligible for UI benefits as the treatment group and the ineligible
as the control group. I use two supplementary empirical strategies to assess the disincentive
effect of extended UI benefits coverage.
First, I investigate the differences in the effect of the average weekly UI benefits in
job search intensity of the eligible individuals between the post-treatment and pre-treatment
period, relative to the ineligible. Second, I apply a difference-in-differences estimator, as the
extensions provide a pseudo-experiment. I focus on gender differences in the effect of UI
extensions. Both strategies provide a negative and statistically significant effect on women,
but for men the estimate is not statistically different from zero. The average treatment effect
for women is around a 10 percentage point decline in a job search probability.
Some caveats apply to this study. Presumably, there have been some classification
errors when it comes to classifying unemployed workers into eligible (for UI benefits) and
ineligible groups. On top of that, I use eligible workers as the treatment group. In practice, a
moderate portion of the eligible workers do not claim benefits (which makes it inappropriate
to put them into treatment group). Both of these limitations will likely cause the results to
be underestimated (i.e., downward bias). If the ATUS begins collecting information about
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UI benefits received by individuals, more precise evaluation of the UI benefits system will
be possible.
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Table 1: Difference-in-Differences (DD) Estimates without Control Variables
Women Men
Control Treatment Difference Control Treatment Difference
Before 0.108 0.205 0.096 0.209 0.275 0.066
(0.023) (0.027) (0.036) (0.044) (0.031) (0.054)
After 0.204 0.227 0.023 0.256 0.291 0.035
(0.032) (0.033) (0.046) (0.050) (0.028) (0.057)
DD - 0.073 - 0.031
(0.058) (0.079)
Notes: The estimates are the average job search probabilities. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. These are calculated using the American Time Use
Survey (ATUS) data from April 2004 to May 2008 (before treatment), and from
2010 to 2011 (after treatment), and applying survey weights.
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Table 2: Characteristics of Individuals by Group
Control Treatment
Before After Before After
Panel A: Women
Less than HS 0.216 0.205 0.170 0.093
High School 0.526 0.541 0.522 0.493
Bachelor’s Degree 0.199 0.195 0.232 0.322
Master’s Degree/PhD 0.055 0.058 0.074 0.092
Age 39.564 39.488 41.622 44.119
Child Dummy 0.645 0.608 0.530 0.465
Married 0.615 0.588 0.608 0.550
White 0.455 0.462 0.657 0.573
Black 0.235 0.220 0.139 0.202
Hispanic 0.220 0.259 0.158 0.164
Others 0.091 0.059 0.045 0.061
Unemployment Duration 8.055 15.269 7.07 23.248
Observations 375 293 377 341
Control Treatment
Before After Before After
Panel B: Men
Less than HS 0.173 0.219 0.121 0.176
High School 0.553 0.547 0.593 0.553
Bachelor’s Degree 0.237 0.185 0.201 0.204
Master’s Degree/PhD 0.0295 0.032 0.071 0.062
Age 43.765 42.022 42.878 43.299
Child Dummy 0.405 0.327 0.376 0.414
Married 0.519 0.499 0.597 0.574
White 0.475 0.540 0.577 0.591
Black 0.310 0.292 0.200 0.187
Hispanic 0.126 0.127 0.160 0.177
Others 0.089 0.041 0.063 0.045
Unemployment Duration 9.397 11.543 7.107 25.401
Observations 154 143 359 410
Note: The estimates are calculated using the American Time
Use Survey (ATUS) data from April 2004 to May 2008 (before
treatment), and from 2010 to 2011 (after treatment).
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Table 3: Probability of Job Search by Group
Women Men
Before After Before After
Prob. N Prob. N Prob. N Prob. N
All unemployed individuals 0.16 752 0.22 634 0.26 513 0.28 553
By types of unemployment
Job losers 0.20 377 0.23 341 0.28 359 0.29 410
Quitters 0.23 27 0.26 16 0.22 19 0.48 11
New- or re-entrants 0.10 348 0.20 277 0.21 135 0.24 132
Job search by race
White 0.18 433 0.22 318 0.25 288 0.31 301
Black 0.16 141 0.22 150 0.26 109 0.35 132
Hispanic 0.10 145 0.19 130 0.24 80 0.12 93
Others 0.16 33 0.24 36 0.36 36 0.23 27
Note: Job search probabilities are calculated using the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS) data from April 2004 to May 2008 (before), and from 2010 to 2011 (after), and
applying survey weights.
Table 4: Job Search Intensity by Group
Women Men
Before After Before After
Intens. N Intens. N Intens. N Intens. N
All unemployed individuals 20.90 752 35.37 634 50.82 513 51.68 553
By types of unemployment
Job losers 31.19 377 36.04 341 54.12 359 56.58 410
Quitters 37.61 27 23.41 16 77.30 19 36.97 11
New- or re-entrants 8.78 348 35.26 277 37.94 135 38.98 132
Job search by race
White 25.10 433 38.20 318 51.25 288 58.91 301
Black 14.79 141 37.50 150 44.44 109 60.84 132
Hispanic 14.50 145 27.22 130 46.75 80 20.58 93
Others 21.25 33 31.11 36 77.23 36 27.66 27
Notes: Job search intensity is calculated using the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data
from April 2004 to May 2008 (before), and from 2010 to 2011 (after), and applying survey
weights. The intensity is measured as the number of minutes spent on job search on a given
diary day.
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Table 5: Normalized Differences: Women
Treat. Group Cont. Group
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Difference
Panel A: During the Pre-Treatment Period
Less than HS 0.170 0.376 0.216 0.412 -0.084
High School 0.522 0.500 0.526 0.500 -0.005
Bachelor’s Degree 0.232 0.423 0.200 0.400 0.056
Masters Degree 0.074 0.262 0.055 0.228 0.056
Ph.D. 0.002 0.043 0.004 0.060 -0.025
Age 41.622 10.119 39.489 9.997 0.150
Age squared 1834.525 866.403 1659.023 849.321 0.145
Child dummy 0.530 0.500 0.645 0.479 -0.166
Partner 0.608 0.489 0.615 0.487 -0.010
White 0.657 0.475 0.455 0.499 0.294
Black 0.140 0.347 0.235 0.424 -0.174
Hispanic 0.159 0.366 0.220 0.415 -0.110
Other 0.045 0.207 0.091 0.288 -0.131
N 377 374
Treat. Group Cont. Group
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Difference
Panel B: During the Post-Treatment Period
Less than HS 0.093 0.290 0.205 0.404 -0.225
High School 0.493 0.501 0.541 0.499 -0.067
Bachelor’s Degree 0.322 0.468 0.195 0.397 0.206
Masters Degree 0.092 0.290 0.058 0.234 0.092
Ph.D. 0 0 0.001 0.030 -0.030
Age 44.119 10.984 39.537 10.247 0.305
Age squared 2066.757 965.846 1667.844 845.857 0.311
Child dummy 0.465 0.500 0.608 0.489 -0.204
Partner 0.550 0.498 0.588 0.493 -0.054
White 0.573 0.495 0.462 0.499 0.158
Black 0.202 0.402 0.220 0.415 -0.032
Hispanic 0.164 0.371 0.259 0.439 -0.165
Other 0.061 0.239 0.059 0.235 0.006
N 341 293
Note: The estimates are calculated using the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS) data from April 2004 to May 2008, and from 2010 to 2011, and
applying survey weights.
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Table 6: Normalized Differences: Men
Treat. Group Cont. Group
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Difference
Panel A: During the Pre-Treatment Period
Less than HS 0.121 0.326 0.173 0.379 -0.104
High School 0.593 0.492 0.553 0.499 0.057
Bachelor’s Degree 0.201 0.401 0.237 0.427 -0.062
Masters Degree 0.071 0.258 0.030 0.170 0.135
Ph.D. 0.013 0.115 0.007 0.086 0.042
Age 42.878 10.272 43.765 11.876 -0.057
Age squared 1943.707 891.635 2055.520 1040.115 -0.082
Child dummy 0.376 0.485 0.405 0.493 -0.042
Partner 0.597 0.491 0.519 0.501 0.111
White 0.577 0.495 0.475 0.501 0.144
Black 0.200 0.401 0.310 0.464 -0.179
Hispanic 0.160 0.367 0.126 0.333 0.069
Other 0.063 0.243 0.089 0.286 -0.070
N 359 154
Treat. Group Cont. Group
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Difference
Panel B: During the Post-Treatment Period
Less than HS 0.176 0.381 0.219 0.415 -0.077
High School 0.553 0.498 0.547 0.500 0.008
Bachelor’s Degree 0.204 0.404 0.185 0.390 0.034
Masters Degree 0.062 0.242 0.032 0.177 0.101
Ph.D. 0.005 0.072 0.017 0.128 -0.077
Age 43.299 11.568 42.022 11.119 0.080
Age squared 2008.297 1004.439 1888.653 964.058 0.086
Child dummy 0.414 0.493 0.327 0.471 0.127
Partner 0.574 0.495 0.499 0.502 0.107
White 0.591 0.492 0.540 0.500 0.072
Black 0.187 0.390 0.292 0.457 -0.177
Hispanic 0.177 0.383 0.127 0.334 0.100
Other 0.045 0.208 0.041 0.199 0.016
N 410 143
Note: The estimates are calculated using the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS) data from April 2004 to May 2008, and from 2010 to 2011, and apply-
ing survey weights.
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Table 7: Results from Nonlinear Difference-in-Differences Mod-
els: Women
Full Unemp. Unemp. W/0 Indivs.
Sample Dur.≤ 99 Dur.≤60 Expecting a Recall
Weeks Weeks and Quitters
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat 0.0983∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.0299) (0.0310) (0.0312) (0.0314)
Post 0.0652 0.0613 0.0687 0.0612
(0.0718) (0.0754) (0.0774) (0.0784)
Treat×Post -0.107∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0437) (0.0453) (0.0494)
Time 0.0221 0.0214 0.0196 0.0238
(0.0163) (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0186)
High School 0.0577 0.0571 0.0634 0.0583
(0.0438) (0.0428) (0.0450) (0.0570)
Bachelor’s Degree -0.0551 -0.0830 -0.0735 -0.0319
(0.0894) (0.0827) (0.0851) (0.122)
Master’s Degree -0.0209 -0.0514 -0.0563 0.000587
(0.130) (0.112) (0.107) (0.200)
Age 0.00153 -0.00201 0.0000694 -0.00182
(0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0141) (0.0152)
Age squared -0.0000393 -0.00000228 -0.0000294 0.00000957
(0.000141) (0.000146) (0.000163) (0.000171)
Child Dummy -0.0375 -0.0459 -0.0498 -0.0337
(0.0363) (0.0366) (0.0362) (0.0452)
Partner -0.0703∗∗ -0.0804∗∗∗ -0.0757∗∗∗ -0.0447
(0.0283) (0.0277) (0.0263) (0.0337)
Black -0.00141 -0.000699 0.00259 -0.00790
(0.0382) (0.0377) (0.0360) (0.0431)
Hispanic 0.0308 0.0421∗ 0.0475∗∗ 0.0161
(0.0242) (0.0231) (0.0240) (0.0246)
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Table 7 Continued ....
Other 0.00411 0.0233 0.0299 -0.0600
(0.0680) (0.0709) (0.0734) (0.0586)
Predict wage 0.344∗∗ 0.388∗∗ 0.374∗∗ 0.339∗
(0.148) (0.151) (0.150) (0.190)
State residual -0.485 -0.473 -0.584 -0.558
(0.612) (0.609) (0.648) (0.733)
Unemploy rate -0.00481 -0.00298 -0.00293 0.000502
(0.00764) (0.00787) (0.00823) (0.00887)
Avg. Weekly UIB -0.000903∗∗∗ -0.00105∗∗∗ -0.00103∗∗∗ -0.00102∗∗∗
(0.000324) (0.000329) (0.000338) (0.000386)
Unemploy Duration 0.000628 0.000578 0.000588 0.000256
(0.000635) (0.000638) (0.000676) (0.000713)
N 1386 1345 1308 1192
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are calculated
using the Delta Method. Errors are clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗ denotes
the significance at the one percent level, ∗∗ at the five percent level, and ∗
at the ten percent level.
The regression (1) consists of all unemployed persons. (2) excludes indi-
viduals eligible for UI benefits who are unemployed more than 26 weeks in
the period between April 2004 and May 2008 and more than 99 weeks in
the period between 2010 and 2011. (3) excludes individuals eligible for UI
benefits who are unemployed more than 26 weeks in the period between
April 2004 and May 2008 and more than 60 weeks in the period between
2010 and 2011. (4) excludes those who voluntarily leave jobs and who are
on a temporary layoff expecting a recall from the past employer.
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Table 8: Results from Baseline Nonlinear Difference-in-Difference
Models: Men
Full Unemp. Unemp. W/0 Indivs.
Sample Dur.≤ 99 Dur.≤60 Expecting a Recall
Weeks Weeks and Quitters
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat 0.0501 0.0376 0.0350 0.108∗
(0.0573) (0.0563) (0.0564) (0.0624)
Post -0.0239 -0.0258 -0.0304 -0.0741
(0.0827) (0.0750) (0.0760) (0.106)
Treat×Post -0.0116 0.00677 -0.00575 -0.0148
(0.0842) (0.0821) (0.0840) (0.0922)
Time 0.0257 0.0253 0.0215 0.0364
(0.0176) (0.0170) (0.0160) (0.0235)
High School 0.0972 0.105 0.153∗ 0.106
(0.102) (0.104) (0.0915) (0.113)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.270 0.304 0.380∗ 0.299
(0.233) (0.238) (0.204) (0.244)
Master’s Degree 0.448∗ 0.455∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.469∗
(0.249) (0.261) (0.198) (0.243)
Ph.D 0.0590 0.138 0.252 0.222
(0.410) (0.461) (0.473) (0.456)
Age 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0533∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0148) (0.0138) (0.0188)
Age squared -0.000451∗∗∗ -0.000499∗∗∗ -0.000480∗∗∗ -0.000583∗∗∗
(0.000168) (0.000165) (0.000154) (0.000204)
Child Dummy 0.0635 0.0465 0.0516 0.0718
(0.0620) (0.0616) (0.0583) (0.0676)
Partner -0.0457 -0.0326 -0.0288 -0.0474
(0.0560) (0.0537) (0.0520) (0.0636)
Black 0.0343 0.0360 0.0265 0.00922
(0.0330) (0.0335) (0.0355) (0.0341)
Hispanic -0.0875∗∗ -0.0973∗∗ -0.0882∗∗ -0.0800∗
(0.0364) (0.0406) (0.0423) (0.0473)
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Table 8 Continued ....
Other 0.00464 -0.000914 0.00736 0.00710
(0.0852) (0.0826) (0.0837) (0.0995)
Predict wage -0.191 -0.230 -0.295 -0.275
(0.248) (0.248) (0.231) (0.284)
State residual 0.896 0.867 1.069 0.771
(0.718) (0.695) (0.719) (0.764)
Unemploy rate -0.0111 -0.0113 -0.00662 -0.0130
(0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0128)
Avg. Weekly UIB 0.000688 0.000714 0.000558 0.000646
(0.000471) (0.000503) (0.000487) (0.000523)
Unemploy Duration -0.000188 -0.000644 -0.00126 -0.000925
(0.000636) (0.000818) (0.000892) (0.000795)
N 1066 1009 968 856
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are calculated
using the Delta Method. Errors are clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗
denotes the significance at the one percent level, ∗∗ at the five percent
level, and ∗ at the ten percent level.
The regression (1) consists of all unemployed persons. (2) excludes
individuals eligible for UI benefits who are unemployed more than 26
weeks in the period between April 2004 and May 2008 and more than
99 weeks in the period between 2010 and 2011. (3) excludes individuals
eligible for UI benefits who are unemployed more than 26 weeks in the
period between April 2004 and May 2008 and more than 60 weeks in
the period between 2010 and 2011. (4) excludes those who voluntarily
leave jobs and who are on a temporary layoff expecting a recall from
the past employer.
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Table 9: Anticipation Effects: Women
Full Sample W/0 Unemp. Dur. >60, Indivs. Expecting
a Recall and Quitters
Variables (1) (2)
Treat 0.0951∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.0313) (0.0364)
Post 0.118 0.142
(0.0942) (0.102)
Treat×Post -0.104∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.0481) (0.0504)
Time 0.0106 0.00444
(0.0189) (0.0215)
N 1312 1052
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are calculated
using the Delta Method. Errors are clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗ denotes
the significance at the one percent level, ∗∗ at the five percent level, and ∗
at the ten percent level.
The regression (1) consists of all unemployed persons. (2) excludes indi-
viduals eligible for UI benefits who are unemployed more than 26 weeks in
the period between April 2004 and 2007 and more than 60 weeks in the
period between 2010 and 2011, and those who voluntarily leave jobs and
who are on a temporary layoff expecting a recall from the past employer.
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Table 10: Placebo Test
April 2004 to May 2008 April 2004 to 2007
Full Sub- Full Sub-
Sample sample Sample sample
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat 0.126∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.0525) (0.0618) (0.0493) (0.0582)
Post -0.0104 0.0213 0.00828 0.0399
(0.0597) (0.0537) (0.0529) (0.0598)
Treat×Post -0.0502 -0.0835 -0.0576 -0.0902
(0.0632) (0.0651) (0.0655) (0.0690)
Time 0.0348 0.0302 0.0166 0.00618
(0.0243) (0.0266) (0.0337) (0.0400)
N 752 594 678 530
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, which
are calculated using the Delta Method. Errors are clus-
tered at the state level. ∗∗∗ denotes the significance at the
one percent level, ∗∗ at the five percent level, and ∗ at the
ten percent level. Subsample (referring to models 2 and 4)
means excluding unemployed individuals expecting a recall
from their past employer, quitters, and those having more
than 26 weeks of unemployment duration.
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Table 11: DD Estimates of Job
Search Intensity
OLS Tobit
Variables (1) (2)
Treat 28.86 161.2
(7.459)∗∗∗ (35.28)∗∗∗
[7.756]∗∗∗ [39.53]∗∗∗
Post 23.38 84.58
(20.10) (73.57)
[17.38] [79.45]
Treat×Post -30.63 -167.4
(17.37)∗ (69.25) ∗∗
[13.83]∗∗ [57.75] ∗∗∗
Time 2.778 17.57
(3.048) (15.97)
[2.929] [14.30]
N 1116 1116
Notes: Standard errors for Tobit
model are calculated using the Delta
Method. Errors reported in paren-
theses are clustered at the state level,
while errors reported in square brack-
ets are calculated without clustering.
∗∗∗ denotes the significance at the one
percent level, ∗∗ at the five percent
level, and ∗ at the ten percent level.
Table 12: Further Robustness Checks
Women
Variables Year Fixed-effects Quadratic Trend W/O > 55 Years
Treat 0.173∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0335) (0.0422)
Post 0.158∗∗ 0.0403 0.102
(0.0728) (0.101) (0.0993)
Treat×Post -0.143∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0479) (0.0508)
N 1116 1116 984
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are calculated
using the Delta Method. Errors are clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗ denotes
the significance at the one percent level, ∗∗ at the five percent level, and ∗
at the ten percent level.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Maximum Weeks of Benefits
Weeks Eligible States
UI 20-26 all
EUC Tier 1 20 all
EUC Tier 2 14 all
EUC Tier 3 13 states with unemployment rate greater than six percent
EUC Tier 4 6 states with unemployment rate greater than 8.5 percent
EB Option 1 13 states with unemployment rate greater than 6.5 percent
EB Option 2 20 states with unemployment rate greater than 8.0 percent
Notes: UI benefits are available for 20 weeks in Missouri and South Carolina. In
Arkansas, the benefits are available for 25 weeks.
Source: Council of Economic Advisors, December 2011. Retrieved February 2013,
from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ui_report_final.pdf
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Appendix B
I derive job search activities from the American Time Use Survey Activity Coding Lexicon.
All activities are coded in a three-tiered classification system. The first-tier category includes
major activities, while the second tier includes subcategory of the first tier, and the third
tier includes subcategory of the second tier. Table A2 presents detailed codes and search
activities in the ATUS 2011 that are used in this paper.
Table A2: Description of the ATUS Lexicon Codes and Activities
Codes Job Search Activities
050401
Contacting employer
Sending resumes to employers
Placing or answering ads
Researching details about a job
Asking about job openings
Researching an employer
Submitting applications
050403
Interviewing by phone or in person preparing for interview
Scheduling or canceling interview (for self)
Preparing for interview
050404
Waiting associated with job search or interview
050405
Security procedures related to job search or interviewing
050499
Job search and interviewing, not elsewhere specified
180504
Travel related to job search and interviewing
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Chapter 4
Relative Wages, Self-Selection, and
Quality of School Teachers: 1964-2013
4.1 Introduction
Debates regarding the quality of U.S. elementary and secondary schools have intensified over
recent years.1 Teachers have always remained in the center of school-quality discussions, as
the literature has reached a broad conclusion that teachers are the singularly most crucial
input in education production (i.e., improving the human capital or the quality of students).2
However, documenting teacher quality over time has proven difficult owing particulary to
two challenges. First, the literature has been unable to settle the issue of what constitutes
the most important attribute of teacher quality (cognitive attributes, experience, education
level, or other non-cognitive traits like passion, creativity, and so on). Second, time-series
1Recent (under)performance in international tests by U.S. students has been used as an evidence of
“subpar” school performance. In the 2012 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests (the
standardized international tests taken by 15-year-olds in math, science, and reading), the U.S. ranked in
the middle or below the average of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries. The U.S. ranked 27th in math, 20th in science, and 17th in reading. Education Secretary Arne
Duncan reacted to the PISA scores of U.S. students as “a picture of educational stagnation.” Duncan’s
remark is available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/threat-educational-stagnation-and-complacency.
2E.g., Hanushek, 1992; Sanders and Rivers, 1996; Chetty et al., 2011; and Hanushek, 2011.
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data measuring teacher quality over time are not available.
Trying to overcome these challenges, I examine the distribution of long-term teacher
ability through the lens of a Roy (1951) model of occupational choice. Additionally, I
supplement the Roy model by analyzing the evolution of teacher characteristics over time
from other dimensions. Specifically, I focus on long-term relative wages of teachers, an
increasing demand for skills in the non-teaching market, and cognitive attributes; all of
them could collectively help us to understand educational outcomes. The focus of this study
is female teachers, as they make up around 75 percent of the total teacher population.
Regardless, I separately carry out most of the estimates for male teachers as well.
I begin the analysis by comparing teachers’ wages with the rest of the occupations
from 1964 to 2013, using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data. An increasing debate
over the inability of schools to attract promising and high-ability candidates to the teaching
profession is rooted in the hypothesis of lower wages.3 The ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions show that the relative annual wages of women in teaching began to fall behind the
non-teaching sector after 1990.4 Note that both women’s labor supply and wage inequality on
the back of skill biased technology changes began to rise since 1980s. However, male teachers
have always been earning less than their counterparts in other sectors. I also emphasize wage
differences of top-earners in the teaching versus non-teaching sector. High-ability college
graduates tend to choose sectors that have higher growth prospects of wages, which could be
reflected by top-earners’ salary. I use a newly developed approach, the recentered influence
function (RIF) regression approach of Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009), to estimate the
distributional difference. The wage gap at the 90th percentile of the distribution is still
sharper than the average gap. For female teachers, compensations at this distribution were
six percent less in 1964, which widened to around 43 percent in 2013. For male teachers, the
gap almost doubled during 1964-2013.
3Some researchers use relative wage as a proxy for teacher quality (e.g., Lakdawalla, 2006).
4I also estimate the regression using hourly wage and the trend is the same.
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Next, I explore the proximate causes of the wage gap between teachers and non-
teachers. As a first step, I use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, developed by Oaxaca
(1973), and Blinder (1973). The objective is to assess whether wage differences between
teachers and other professionals are due to observed characteristics such as education, wage,
sex and race or to unobserved factors which could be institutional differences in wage setting
or premiums for working in the non-teaching sector. Estimations show that female teachers
were able to collect some sort of premiums in the 1970s. However, the trend reverses after
1980, with female non-teachers being able to reap additional benefits or collect a premium.
For males, non-teachers have always earned a wage premium. Above all, the observed
characteristics cannot explain the wage gap.
Second, to understand why teachers are paid less than that of non-teachers for the
same characteristics (as shown by the decomposition), I apply a constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) framework to analyze the growing demand for skills in the non-teaching sector.
This examination is important in view of Baumol’s (1967) observation that technological
changes have little effect on increasing productivity in the education industry, while having
a larger effect in other sectors. If Baumol (1967) is right, then the relatively higher rise
in productivity in the non-teaching sector should increase the demand and relative wage
of non-teachers. I follow the approach of Katz and Murphy (1992), and Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2008), who apply the framework to study the demand for skills in the economy as
a whole. I find a positive and statistically significant trend of demand for skills over years.
In other words, there is a shift in relative demand for non-teachers, causing non-teachers’
relative wage to grow faster. Third, I use a simple approach to estimate the influence of
unions on teacher pay in the 1990s and 2000s. Calculations show that being a union member
in teaching has a lower wage premium than in non-teaching sectors.
In light of the wage gap and the demand for skills in the economy, I next measure the
distribution of unobserved ability in the teaching sector over time through the prism of a Roy
89
(1951) model of occupational choice. This is in response to the literature in the economics
of education which suggests that unobservable qualities are more important than observable
ones to influence student performance. For instance, Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007),
using matched student-teacher administrative data from Chicago public high schools, show
that observed characteristics of teachers could explain only a little about quality. I use
evidence of self-selection of workers into teaching as a basis for unobserved ability. The idea
is that individuals with a higher unobserved quality self-select themselves into a sector that
has a higher variance of wage, where the likelihood of getting higher prices for their skills
increases. Note that individuals have different skills and aptitudes suited to and valued by
occupations differently. For example, skill or ability that makes an individual a great teacher
might not be useful to be a lawyer. Hence, individuals sort themselves into an occupation
where their skills are valued most. From the perspective of schools, the evidence of positive
selection is considered to be good, because it suggests that those who join teaching are better
able workers than those teachers that schools would see if individuals were randomly assigned
to teaching.
Results show that females have a positive selection into teaching and negative selection
into the non-teaching sector before 2000. After 2000, there has been a positive selection
into both sectors, which imply that they began to select a profession on the basis of their
comparative advantage. However, the magnitude of the selection variable has largely been
declining for teachers, and steadily been increasing for non-teachers. These suggest that the
relative strength of self-selection into teaching, and consequently teacher ability, is on the
decline over time.
As a final yardstick to analyze teaching quality, I document the relative cognitive
ability of teachers. (This is viewed as the supplement to the Roy model.) I use four cohorts
of National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), specifically NLS of Youth 1997, NLS of Youth 1979,
NLS of Young Women and Mature Women, NLS of Young Men and Older Men. I document
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the standardized test scores and math ability of teachers versus non-teachers in high school
to measure quality. By these yardsticks, I find teachers have lower quality than non-teachers.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. The estimates of the Roy
model could be viewed as documentation of unobserved quality of teachers over time. Even
though unobserved teacher attributes are found to be more important than observed ones,
including cognitive ability and experience, there is a paucity of literature documenting un-
observed quality of teachers over time (see Autor, 2009, p. 11, for importance and absence
of the literature looking at the self-selection). Instead, Bacolod (2007) limits Roy’s (1951)
model mainly to a framework to organize discussion about occupational choice in teaching.
Furthermore, the evidence of self-selection in this paper is very important from the per-
spective of policy makers or school districts. The declining magnitude of the self-selection
variable suggests that rigid salary schedules of school districts might have driven away highly
able individuals from teaching. Hence, schools may want to increase the variance of wages to
attract better teachers. The implication of this paper’s finding is also related to the literature
studying the policies to improve teacher quality (e.g., Rothstein, 2012 ).
This paper adds to the literature of a growing demand for skills in the non-teaching
sector. Stoddard (2003) and Lakdawalla (2006) consider the rising price of skills in the non-
teaching sector for falling quality of teachers. However, they essentially use the relative wage
as a proxy for quality. This paper’s estimates of demand for skills shed
light on why able workers shift from teaching to non-teaching. My approach to
investigate the wage gap in the upper-tail distribution is new in the literature. This paper
also contributes to the limited literature using standardized test scores to gauge the quality
of teachers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II documents the trend of school
teachers’ wages, including the conditional mean wage and upper-tail wage comparisons. I
look at main proximate causes of the wage gap in Section III. Section IV builds a Roy Model
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to present the evidence of self-selection of teachers. Section V documents evidence of the
distribution of cognitive quality over time. Section VI concludes.
4.2 Data and Wage Structure
In this section, I describe data sources, and the evolution of the relative wages of teachers
in the U.S. I think that understanding the relative wages is a good starting point for un-
derstanding teacher quality since, in the literature, the relative wage is used as a proxy for
quality. It is also a major complaint of school officials for their inability to attract the best
candidates in teaching. Then, in later sections, I seek sources of the wage gap and investigate
its implications for teacher quality.
4.2.1 Data
The main data for this paper are drawn from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS)
from survey years 1964 to 2013.5 The Census Bureau began issuing the CPS data in March
1962. However, the March 1963 survey lacks information about education. I limit data to
individuals age 25-65 and working full time, using the Census Bureau’s definition of 35 hours
of work a week. I exclude ages below 25 to avoid the issues related to youth unemployment
and early career choices.6 Furthermore, as in Manski (1987), Dolton (1990), and Dolton and
Makepeace (1993), I restrict the data to individuals with a bachelor’s degree (16-years of
education) or above. The goal is to get a comparison group that is similar to teachers and
to avoid the estimates being distorted due to the comparison of two different groups. Note
that the teaching profession generally requires a four-year-college degree and a full-time
workload. In the CPS data, I identify teachers using three-digit census occupation codes
5I extract data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).
6I also estimate only using individuals age 25-54, a prime-age working group. And, results are qualitatively
similar.
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before 2003 and four-digit occupation codes thereafter (See Appendix for details). Teachers,
in this paper, refer to both public and private school teachers, and include kindergarten,
elementary, and secondary school teachers. I use the 1999 Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (CPI-U) to convert wages into real values in terms of 1999 dollars. I also
use the appropriate CPS survey weights to create the entire distribution of my variables of
interest.
Additionally, I obtain cognitive quality data from the four cohorts from the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS), specifically NLS of Youth 1997, NLS of Youth 1979, NLS of
Young Women and Mature Women, NLS of Young Men and Older Men. These cohorts
entail widely used measures of cognitive attributes, and the cohorts are surveyed at different
points in time, which enable me to analyze teacher cognitive skills over time. Details of data
description and construction are provided in the Appendix.
4.2.2 Trend over Half a Century
In this subsection, I document the evolution of wages of teachers versus non-teaching workers
in the U.S from 1964 to 2013. Wages are measured in constant 1999 dollars. Figure 1
plots unconditional average annual log wages of teachers against all workers in non-teaching
professions by gender. Female teachers earned more than their counterparts in non-teaching
sectors until the mid-90s (Panel A of Figure 1). Thereafter, the trend reverses, and the
gap continues to rise, except for a short period around the financial crisis of 2007-08. The
average relative wage has historically been lower for male teachers (Panel B of Figure 1). I
also plot the hourly wage for female and male teachers in Figure 2, and it is consistent with
the annual wage.
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Teaching versus Finance and Engineering
I also compare teachers’ salaries against workers in finance and engineering, as it is widely
believed that these two professions have become more lucrative for high-aptitude individuals
in recent periods.7 Hence, I think that it is important to compare teacher pay with that of the
pay in these two professions. This could, to some extent, help us understand the implication
of the compensation for luring individuals with top quality into teaching. Figure 3 contains
the annual log wages of teachers versus those in finance and engineering. Before 1980, female
teachers earned more than those working in finance (Panel A of Figure 3). Females in finance
began to catch up with teachers since 1980, and the gap began to widen after mid-90s. This
finding relates to Philippon and Reshef’s (2012), which shows that finance became a high
wage sector after 1985. Female engineers have always fared better than teachers. On the
other hand, male teachers’ wages were lower than that of the wages of engineers and those in
finance since the beginning of the sample, with the gap widening markedly after the mid-90s
(Panel B of Figure 3).
4.2.3 OLS Estimates
Next, I proceed to estimate the relative wages of teachers, accounting for different demo-
graphic dimensions, education, and unobserved factors. I fit ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions for women and men separately for each year’s survey data from 1964-2013. In
particular, I estimate the regression in the following form, (which is also called state-fixed
effect regression):
yi,t = α + βXi,t + Ti + λs + i,t, (4.1)
7Philippon and Reshef (2012) find that finance became high wage and skill intensive sector after 1985.
This finding could have direct implication in the allocation of talent in other sectors, including teaching.
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where Ti is a dummy variable for teachers, λs is a vector of state-fixed effects, Xi,t are
demographic variables such as education,8 sex, age, age-squared, race, marital status, and
the metropolitan residence.9 The dependent variable is the annual log wage. I plot the
coefficient of the teacher dummy for each year in Figure 4. These coefficients appear to
confirm the pattern of Figure 1. Women teachers’ relative earnings began to fall around
the mid-70s, and became negative after the early 1990s (Panel A of Figure 4). It should
be noted that skill-biased technological changes, among other factors, accelerated U.S. wage
inequality since the 1980s. The wage gap became the largest right before the financial
crisis of 2007-08. Additionally, the persistent higher teacher pay before the early 1990s is
attributed to massive hirings of teachers in the 1960s and 1970s to meet educational needs
of the baby boom cohorts and subsequent rise in teacher-student ratio. As Flyer and Rosen
(1997) argue, in the 1980s, on the back of the early hirings, the experience of women teachers
rose substantially, an important factor for higher wages. For men, the estimated effect of
being a teacher is consistently negative (Panel B of Figure 4). The earnings gap continues
to widen. I also estimate equation (4.1), replacing the dependent variable with log hourly
wages. Figure 5 graphs the estimated coefficients. The message coming from these estimates
is consistent with that of those from the log annual wages.
A few studies have analyzed the relative wages of teachers, and their findings reach
a consensus conclusion of decline in teacher pay (see Podgursky, 2011 for the review).
Hanushek and Rivkin (1997) calculate, from the U.S. census data, the proportion of college
graduates who earn less than teachers. Likewise, Lakdawalla (2006), and Stoddard (2003)
use teacher earnings relative to non-teaching graduates as a proxy for measuring quality.
Allegretto, Corcoran and Mishel (2004), using the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data, find
that teachers’ wages are around 14 percent lower than those of workers in comparable occu-
pations to teachers. The estimate of Taylor (2008), which uses the U.S. 2000 census data,
8Education is divided into two categories: a four-year college degree and an advanced degree(an master’s
degree or beyond).
9I use a separate dummy variable for the central metropolitan, and outer metropolitan.
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shows the average teacher’s wage (relative to the comparable occupations) is around four
percent lower. This paper’s estimates, coming from the March CPS data and covering a long
time span, are helpful in visualizing “turning points” in teacher salary. As I have shown,
lower teacher salary is not a permanent phenomenon, particularly for women teachers, but
a relatively new trend emerging from increasing outside opportunities of women. Overall,
female teachers earned around 10-20 percent more than other comparable females workers
(college-graduated workers) in the ’70s, and around 10 percent more in the ’80s, and earned
around 10 percent less in the ‘90s. Likewise, they continue to earn less in the 2000s (around
10-15 percent).
4.2.4 Recentered Influence Function Estimates for Top Earners
In this subsection, I investigate the wage distribution of teachers in the upper-tail, relative
to non-teachers. This study of distributional wage differences is new in the literature of
economics of education. The focus on central tendency of wage (i.e, the mean wage) could
miss an important element of occupational choice: Many well-qualified people could still
choose a low-paying job if they see a tremendous prospect of salary growth. Particularly, if
top-earners in other sectors earn more money, recent graduates may follow these professions
in hopes of future career growth. Quantile regression has become popular in the study of
distributional wage gaps between two groups.10 As in Boudarbat and Lemieux (2014), I use
the unconditional quantile regression(UQR) method of Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009),
operationalized as Recentered Influence Function (RIF henceforth). The RIF approach im-
proves the conditional quantiles regression (developed by Koenker and Bassett, 1978). The
main shortcoming of the conditional quantile regression is that the estimates of the effect of
explanatory variables on the mean of outcome variable are not consistent. In other words,
the expectation of conditional quantiles regression at a particular quartile does not equal
10Mueller (1998) uses quantile regression to investigate wage differences in Canada. Melly (2005) applies
such an approach in German context.
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the unconditional expectation of the quartile. To further clarify, conditional expectation
of the OLS regression average up to the unconditional expectation due to the law of large
numbers but this is no longer true with the quantile estimator, (i.e., EXE(Y |X) = E(Y ),
but EXE(Y
τ |X) 6= E(Y τ)). To operationalize the UQR, Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009)
show that the dependent variable (which is annual log wage in this paper) can be replaced
by the RIF. The RIF for the τth quantile qτ is defined as:
RIF (Wi,t, q(τ)) =
q(τ) + [1(Wi,t ≥ q(τ))− (1− τ)]
f(q(τ))
, (4.2)
where 1(.) is an indictor function equal to 1 if Wi,t ≥ q(τ), and f(.) is a density of the
marginal distribution of wage. Then, the RIF regression is:
RIF (Wi,t, q(τ)) = βTi +Xi,tγ + ei,t (4.3)
where Ti is a dummy variable for teachers, and Xi,t is a vector of the same control variables
used in the OLS regression above.
I run the RIF regression (equation 4.3) at the 90th percentiles from 1964-2013 for
men and women separately to capture wage differences between top earners in the teaching
and non-teaching sectors. I plot the coefficients of β from the regression for each year in
Figure 6. I also fit the RIF regression in the 10th percentile to see how trends differ at the
top- and bottom-tails. A simple picture that emerges from the quartile estimations is that
the wage gap between teachers and non-teachers in the upper-tail (90th percentile) grew
much faster than in the lower-tail (10th percentile) or in mean. In the early 1970s, women
teachers earned around 7 percent less than non-teachers at the wage distribution of 90th
percentile (Panel A of Figure 6). However, the gap widened to above 43 percent in 2013.
For male teachers, the wage gap grew more slowly than female teachers (Panel B of Figure
6). In 2013, the gap between teachers and non teachers at the 90th percentile was twice
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what it was in 1964. I also estimate the conditional quantile regression as a robustness check
and Figure 7 plots the estimates. The message from it is same as the RIF regression.
4.3 Proximate Causes of Wage Gap
After showing the declining relative wages in an earlier section, I, in this section, turn to
examine the causes behind the teacher-nonteacher wage gap. First, I use the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition to analyze whether the wage gap could be explained by the differences in
the distribution of observable characteristics between teachers and non-teachers. However,
observed characteristics couldn’t explain the entire wage gap. In the next step, I analyze
the gap using a simple demand and supply framework in the competitive labor market. The
objective of this framework is to understand if there is a secular increase in demand for
non-teaching jobs, raising their earnings relatively faster than that of teachers. Third, I look
at the role of declining union influence, and at the monopsony power of school districts.
4.3.1 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
In this subsection, I identify the role of “explained” and “unexplained” components to explain
the differences between teachers and non-teachers wages. When the wage gap cannot be
explained by observed characteristics, it has implications for allocations of skills. This is
because the non-teaching sector has a more favorable wage setting system to its workers
than that of teaching. The most popular methodology in the literature for such a study is
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, developed by Oaxaca (1973), and Blinder (1973). The
technique has widely been used in labor economics in different contexts (e.g., wage differences
between the black and the white, men and women, public and private sector workers, unions
and non-unions, older and younger workers).
In this paper’s setting, the “explained” component includes education, wage, race,
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and the state of residence (the same variables used equation 4.1). And, the “unexplained”
component could be interpreted as a premium of working in the non-teaching sector, institu-
tional differences in wage setting or institutional arrangement of school system that rewards
teachers with higher wages. (Schools might have salary schedules that pay higher or lower
wages to a teacher than he/she could get in the non-teaching sector. For example, unions in
schools could put pressure on school districts to set higher wage.) I estimate the following
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition:
∆wage = [E(Xtc)
′(βtc − βntc) + [E(Xtc)− E(Xntc)]′(βtc − βntc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unexplained
+ [E(Xtc)− E(Xtc)]′βtc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Explained
(4.4)
I pool six years of CPS data over time into eight single cross-sectional datasets (i.e.,1964-
1969, 1970-1975, 1976-1981, 1982-1987, 1988-1993, 1994-1999, 2000-2005, 2006-2013).11 It
is not uncommon in empirical analysis to pool the CPS data for reasons of making datasets
richer, and of convenience. In my case, the pooling is more of a convenience of presenting
results. Since my purpose is to present the patterns over time, pooling for the particular
number of years does not alter the story. I also add time dummies in the estimation. I
construct the decomposition separately for male and female. Table 1 contains results for
women and Table 2 for men. Recall that until 1991, the mean log wage of women teachers is
greater than non-teachers (see Figure 1). From 1964-75, the estimate of non-teacher women’s
“explained” component is positive and unexplained component negative. Specifically, the
observed characteristics cannot explain why non-teachers were paid around 0.16 log points
less. This suggests that women teachers were able to reap some sort of premium (because
of favorable salary schedules of school districts or greater discrimination outside teaching).
11The last dataset has more than six years as the total number of years cannot be evenly divided by six.
Though the choice of six years is random, changing years does not alter the pattern of my results.
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Note that in the 1960s and early 1970s, teacher union’s influence was on the rise. From 1975-
93, both explained and unexplained components are negative. This means that non-teachers
should be paid 0.01-0.03 log points less based on observed characteristics. (Put differently,
teachers should be paid 0.01-0.03 log points more given their observed characteristics.) Still,
the model cannot explain why non-teachers are paid around 0.09-0.2 log points less. As
mentioned above, this could be a premium of working in schools. However, after 1991,
the trend reverses, with the estimate of the “unexplained” component being positive. This
implies that non-teachers are able to collect a wage premium (due to higher wage setting in
the non-teaching sector or restricted salary schedules of school districts). The recent pattern
that women teachers are not paid as much as their counterparts with the same characteristics
has implications for quality issue, which I will explore in later sections.
As contained in Table 2, the unexplained component for men has always been positive,
which suggests that non-teachers are getting a wage premium (or a higher wage which cannot
be explained by observed characteristics).
4.3.2 Demand for Skills
If observed characteristics cannot explain the wage gap, then what could be the other plau-
sible reasons? One strong possibility is that the demand for skills in the non-teaching sector
has risen at a quicker pace than in teaching. This hypothesis is in line with Baumol (1967),
who notes that economic forces like technological changes raise worker productivity differ-
ently across sectors, and views teaching as a sector where productivity per worker remains
relatively constant. If this is true, quicker productivity increases in the non-teaching sector
has increased the sector’s relative wage.
Furthermore, it could be noted that shifts in demand and supply of teachers also
affect the relative wage. The teacher-student ratio has declined over time. (It was 13.59
[per hundred students] in 2010 compared with 21.10 in 1972). Note that during that period,
100
number of students has increased, which has in turn increased the demand for teachers. On
the supply side, it is well documented that women’s labor force participation and education
level increased over the years. For instance, the fraction of women with a four-year college-
degree increased three times between 1964 and 2000 (see Corcoran, Evans and Schwab, 2004).
In this paper, I focus on the relative demand for non-teachers. Specifically, I use a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function to study the growing demand for skills
in the non-teaching sector, which could explain the declining relative wages of teachers.
My analysis follows a growing literature in rising demand for and price of skills in
the U.S. economy.12 A central message coming from this literature is that there has been
a secular growth in the demand for skills (college-educated workers) since 1960. This has
direct implications for teaching. When the demand for skills in the non-teaching sector rises,
pushing wages up, the wage gap between teachers and non-teachers is bound to increase.
Ceteris paribus, schools should afford to pay higher wages to get the same-skilled person.
Otherwise, with the same level of salary spending, they end up having a lower-skilled worker.
Drawing insight from this literature, Lakdawalla (2006) uses a theoretical framework to
explain why a rise in the demand for skills (consequently the price) in the non-teaching
sector induces schools to replace skilled teachers with unskilled ones. Similarly, Stoddard
(2003) argues that the rise in the skill price for women and fall in teacher-student ratio
lead schools to hire low quality teachers. Both Lakdawalla (2006) and Stoddard (2003)
essentially use relative wages to measure increasing prices of skills in non-teaching sector. I
use a different approach to test this hypothesis
To proceed with an empirical approach to measure the effect of increasing price of
skills in the non-teaching sector, I use a simple conceptual framework, following the approach
of Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008). Philippon and Reshef
(2012) build on this approach to study the relative demand in finance. Let’s consider two
12See Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998; Acemoglu, 2002; Autor, Katz and Kearney,
2008, for detailed review.
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types of workers, non-teachers and teachers with high human capital and moderate or low
human capital, respectively, in a closed economy. The aggregate production in the economy
takes the following form:
Y =
[
θ(atNntc)
σ−1
σ + (1− θ)(btNtc)
σ−1
σ
] σ
1−σ
, (4.5)
where Nntc and Ntc are the number of non-teachers and teachers respectively, and
σ, the aggregate elasticity of substitution, is assumed to be greater than one.13 at and bt
are parameters measuring productivity. If changes in technology equally support production
of education and non-education goods, at and bt change in a similar fashion (i.e., will have
the same growth rates). As Baumol (1967) suggests, technological changes have dispropor-
tionally favored non-teachers to increase productivity. For example, with the availability of
new technology and software, a worker in finance is able to produce more tasks now than
decades ago, say in the 1960s. (He/she is able to execute more transactions through com-
puter, quickly analyze big data and so on.) However, teaching methodology or approach,
especially until high school, has remained the same for a long time. Hence, teacher output
has not increased considerably due to technological changes.
In order to connect this theoretical concept with the empirical estimation, I, following
the literature, assume that the labor market is perfectly competitive. So workers are paid
equal to their marginal products. After solving for cost minimization problem for equation
(4.5) and some algebraic steps, I get
lnω =
σ − 1
σ
ln(
at
bt
)− 1
σ
ln(
Nntc
Ntc
), (4.6)
where lnω = ln(Wntc
Wtc
). To proceed to estimate equation (4.6), I assume that relative wages
of teachers to non-teachers and the ratio of supply varies by year, and σ is time-invariant.
13Actually, we find σ greater than one in the empirical estimation later. In the literature too, σ is found
to be greater than one. See for Katz and Murphy, 1992, and Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998, for review.
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And I estimate the following regression:
lnω = η0 + β1t− β2η + t (4.7)
where η is ln(Nntc
Ntc
), and its parameter β2 estimates
1
σ
, and the parameter of time
trend β1 estimates wage premium or demand for skills in the non-teaching sector. And, my
hypothesis is that
dln(
at
bt
)
dt
> 0. In words, the relative productivity of non-teachers is on the
rise due to the relative increase in skill-augmenting technology. More importantly,
dln(
at
bt
)
dt
> 0
is positive when σ > 1, which in turn indicates the shift in the demand for non-teachers to
the right and up.
I estimate equation (4.7), using the CPS data from 1964-2013 for men and women
separately. To estimate it, I aggregate wages by year. This gives me 50 observations. I
use a linear time trend, t, and estimate its coefficient β1. Table 3 contains the results. I
find a positive and statistically significant value of β1 (and σ in the range of 1.11-1.62),
showing increased demand for skills in the non-teaching sector and the relative productivity
of non-teachers has been increasing. The increase in the productivity of workers in the
non-teaching sector should increase the price of their skills, and hence the relative wages
of non-teachers. The results are consistent with Baumol’s (1967) view that education is
a “relatively constant productivity industry.” The rising demand and price of skills in the
non-teaching sector should have implications for allocation of talents between teaching and
non-teaching sectors. And, I use a Roy (1951) Model of occupational choice in Section V to
understand the distribution of skills over time.
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4.3.3 Unions and Monopsony
Next, I analyze the influence of union or collective bargaining and monopsony power of
schools14 in the relative wages of teachers. After the steady rise of teachers’ unions in the
1960s and 1970s, researchers have been trying to estimate the contribution of unionization
or collective bargaining on teacher salary; mostly they find positive effects (e.g., Baugh
and Stone, 1982; Ballou and Podgursky, 2002). Hoxby (1996), a more comprehensive and
widely cited paper in teacher unionization, finds that unionization leads to over 9 percent
increase in per student spending; most of which goes to teacher pay. Lovenheim (2009),
which contradicts Hoxby’s findings, shows little effect of unionization on teachers’ wages.
Likewise, West and Mykerezi (2011) find that unionization increases the starting salary of
teachers by approximately four percent.
I use two simple approaches to look at the effect of unionization on teachers’ relative
pay. First, I run the regression similar to the wage equation (4.1) adding a dichotomous
variable of union membership and its interaction with teacher.15 The interaction variable
measures the relative influence of union coverage on teachers’ wages to non-teachers’. Un-
fortunately, the CPS data do not contain information on union membership prior to 1990,
limiting the estimation to the period thereafter. Since my goal is to shed light on the overall
effect, rather than the yearly effect of unionization, I divide the data into two sets: 1990-2000,
and 2001-2013, and run two regressions for each gender. I also include year-fixed effects in
the regression model.
Table 4 contains results for both female and male teachers. If an individual were a
female teacher and had union coverage, the wage was around five percent less in the ’90s, as
compared to the wage of a union-member woman non-teacher. Likewise, a union-member
woman-teacher has a lower wage than a non-teacher union-member in 2000s. However, the
14Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to quantify the casual effect of union and monopsony power
in teacher wage.
15Union membership variable also includes non-members if they are covered by union.
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effect is not statistically different from zero. For men, I do not find any statistically significant
effect of being a union member and teacher. Note that being a union member has a positive
effect on wage for both men and women. Nonetheless, the coefficients are negative. Overall,
the message is that teachers are not getting any positive effect of union coverage compared
to non-teachers in recent decades.
Second, I look at the wage distribution of teachers at the 10th percentile. Unioniza-
tion increases across-the-board salary schedules, even though it compresses the variation of
salary (e.g., Hoxby and Leigh, 2004). Hence, those at the lower distribution are expected to
have more stable salaries. I use the estimates derived above (using both the RIF and condi-
tional quantile regressions). As shown in Figures 6-7, teachers’ salary at the 10th percentile
distribution is more stable than at the 90th percentile. This should be read with caution,
however. (Even though it sheds some light on the power of union, it is hard to entirely credit
the distribution of wage at the lower-tail to unions.) Taken both approaches together, it sug-
gests that even though unionization in teaching has favored those at the lower distribution,
it does not have any effect in raising a teacher’s wage higher than a non-teacher.
Furthermore, monopsony power in school districts might have pulled teacher salary
down. For instance, Ransom and Sims (2010), who find a significant presence of monopsony
power in public school districts in Missouri, suggest that teachers’ salaries could be lower by
around 27 percent, compared to the salary they could have otherwise earned in the absence
of monopsony power of school districts.
4.4 Roy Model of Self-Selection
In view of the evidence of the falling relative wage of teachers and rising demand for non-
teaching jobs in Section III, I next explore the distribution of teachers’ skill over time through
the prism of a Roy (1951) model of occupational choice. It is worth mentioning that various
105
observers have hypothesized that rising job opportunities coupled with rising earnings outside
of teaching have decreased teacher quality. However, there is little evidence of testing this
hypothesis due to lack of time-series data, as recognized by Corcoran, Evans and Schwab
(2004). Autor (2009) observes that wages in the teaching profession have turned out to be
be “a higher floor and lower ceiling” for women due to expanded outside opportunities.16I
use a two-sector Roy model to overcome this data issue and shed light on ability through
self-selection. Going by Autor’s (2009) observation, the Roy model should predict a declining
or changing (from positive to negative) trend of self-selection into teaching.
The framework of the Roy model has been widely used in modelling choices, including
occupation, and education. Willis and Rosen (1979), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, 1990),
Heckman and Honore (1990) formalized and expanded the Roy model. Borjas (1987) applies
the Roy model to study the self-selection and earnings of Mexican immigrants in the U.S.
Gould (2002) uses Roy model to understand how changing prices of skills over time have
altered the wage inequality in the U.S. Bacolod (2007) draws theoretical insight of a Roy
(1951) model from Borjas (1987) to explain the distribution of teachers’ quality prior to 1990.
I significantly extend Bacolod (2007), with this paper’s objective, framework, and findings
having different implications.17 In particular, the contribution of this paper is to apply
the framework of a Roy (1951) model to provide the evidence of self-selection over time to
illustrate how changing prices of women’s skills in the non-teaching sector have changed the
distribution of teacher ability. Rather, the concept of this paper is in spirit closer to Correa,
Parro and Reyes (2014), who apply the Roy model to provide the evidence of self-selection
of teachers into public schools in Chile.
In spirit of Roy (1951), I assume that individuals make optimizing decisions about
their career choice. Note that optimizing career choice is equivalent to optimizing wage.
16Hoxby and Leigh (2004) shows that compression of wages by union is a leading cause for decline in
teacher quality measured by SAT scores.
17Bacolod (2007), in a footnote, briefly mentions that the estimates of the Roy model’s parameters (es-
timated using the census data until 1990) are negative, implying that there is absolute selection of women
into non-teaching.
106
The decision stems from the fact that individuals are endowed with certain, different skills
and they choose a market to work, where their skills fetch higher earnings. Prices of skills
vary across markets and over time, thereby altering the distribution of the relative skills
across markets. To illustrate the ability of teachers over time, I assume that the economy
constitutes two market sectors (teaching and non-teaching), and workers are multi-skilled,
but can work in only either one of them. (They cannot work in both sectors at one time.)
To view how the distribution of teacher ability can be changed over time due to the rise
in price of skills in the non-teaching sector, let’s consider a simple example of an occupational
choice of a talented woman named Kelly. Suppose she is good at trading financial products,
and is also capable of teaching; this brings a choice between two occupations: finance and
teaching. It is indeed true that if she becomes a teacher, she can teach in more effective
way than an average teacher. Also, let’s suppose that initially there is not a big salary
difference between teaching and finance. This could initially make her almost indifferent
to joining teaching or finance. And with new technological changes, say the development
of high-frequency trading system, she now can trade financial products in a quicker speed
and greater amount. Her skill now can significantly improve a firm’s revenue, promoting
it to provide a very high level of compensation. On the other hand, technological change
will not help her to increase education production by much, since the teaching methodology
has remained virtually same over time. For instance, even though classes are equipped with
computer or other technological devices, she cannot teach several classes at one time. Above
all, somewhat rigid salary schedules do not leave much room to pay her markedly higher
salary than the rest of her peers. As a result, her optimum career choice will clearly be
finance.
To formalize the concept of the Roy model, let tc and ntc represent teaching and
non-teaching sectors, respectively. Building on Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), I assume that
a representative agent has an N-vector of skills S, which are used to produce an amount of
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task Ti(S), where i ∈ (tc, ntc). Prices of tasks are are denoted as pitc and pintc, respectively.
The task function Ti(S) maps a worker’s ability or skills onto tasks the worker can perform
in sector i, where i ∈ (tc, ntc). For example, the task function maps from an individual’s
passion, creativity, efficiency, knowledge, dedication, and motivation onto the individual’s
teaching ability or task. Workers are paid equivalent to the total price of their tasks, i.e, wi
= Ti(S)× pitc. Hence, the log wages in the teaching and non-teaching sectors are
lnWtc = lnpitc + lnTtc(S) (4.8)
lnWntc = lnpintc + lnTntc(S) (4.9)
Workers are heterogenous in their preferences and ability or skill to execute tasks. To
maximize income, a representative worker chooses the sector having the higher wage return
to skill, i.e, Ttc(S)pitc > Tntc(S)pintc. Following Roy (1951), I assume that log of tasks
(lnTtc, lnTntc) are normally distributed with mean (µtc, µntc) and covariance matrix Σ. The
task function Ttc(S) contains both observed characteristics or skills (Xβ), and unobserved
vector (η) with E(η) = 0. I then describe the wage equations as
lnWtc,i = lnpitc,i + lnTtc,i = lnpitc,i +Xβtc,i + ηtc,i = αtc,i +Xβtc,i + ηtc,i (4.10)
lnWntc,i = lnpintc,i + lnTntc,i = lnpintc,i +Xβntc,i + ηntc,i = αntc,i +Xβntc,i + ηntc,i,(4.11)
where ηtc and ηntc are normally distributed random errors with mean zero and the standard
variance-covariance matrix of bivariate normal distribution.
Above, I derive the population distribution of wages and abilities in the teaching and
non-teaching sectors. The wages and abilities derived above would be true if individuals
were randomly assigned to teaching and non-teaching sectors. However, in real life, rational
individuals self-select into an occupation on the basis of their observed and unobserved
skills and preferences. Then, the next question is who decides to become a teacher? A
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worker decides to join teaching if lnWtc > lnWntc, and the probability of going into teaching
is Pr(tc) = Pr(lnWtc > lnWntc) = Φ(ctc). Note that Φ(.) is the standard cumulative
distribution function for a normal variable.
In view of an individual’s decision to select either one of the sectors, it is necessary to
account for the self-selection issue (see Heckman 1976, 1979) to characterize the distribution
of wages and abilities within the teaching or non-teaching sector. Before proceeding for
the derivation of wages and abilities, let ζ = tc − ntc, then σζ =
√
V ar(tc − ntc) =√
σ2tc + σ
2
ntc − 2σntc,tc. The observed log wages in teaching sector is
E(lnWtc|Xtc, T = 1) = E(αtc +Xβtc + ηtc|lnWtc > lnWntc)
= αtc +Xβtc +
σ2tc − σtc,ntc
σζ
λ(c) (4.12)
,where λ(c) is φ(c)
Φ(c)
, and c = αtc+Xβtc−αtc−Xβtc
σζ
. In the similar approach, the mean of the
observed log wages in non-teaching sector is
E(lnWntc|Xntc,i, T = 0) = E(αntc +Xβntc + ηntc|lnWtc < lnWntc)
= αntc +Xβntc +
σ2ntc − σntc,tc
σζ
λ(−c), (4.13)
where λ(−c) is φ(c)
1−Φ(c) . In equations 4.12-4.13, λ(.) is referred to as the so-called inverse-mill
ratio, and it is always positive and decreasing function of c.
Now, the interest is in knowing the sign and magnitude of the coefficients of the so-
called inverse-mill ratios to understand the distribution of skills within each sector. These
coefficients are jointly determined by the variance of the ability within each sector and the
covariance of abilities across teaching and non-teaching. Note that as mentioned earlier,
to maximize utility (which is equivalent to wage maximization), workers choose professions
according to their tastes and skills. Different professions require different skills. For example,
a worker who is very good at teaching may not be a good engineer or finance worker. Thus, a
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worker who is good at teaching becomes a teacher, and good at finance works in the finance
industry. If the worker has very high teaching skill and very low finance skill, then covariance
between teaching and finance skill is low. On the other hand, when both sectors require the
same general skills, there will not be any selection issue. This is because the nature the work
becomes “anybody-can-do” type.
In terms of the signs of both coefficients λ(.) in equations 4.12-4.13, we can have three
possibilities: (i) the coefficients are positive in both equations; (i) the coefficient is positive
in teachers’ wage equation and negative in non-teachers; and (iii) the coefficient is positive
in non-teachers’ wage equation and negative in teachers. However, it is not possible to have
negative coefficients in both the equations, as shown in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985). To
see why both coefficients cannot be negative, let’s look at it from mathematical perspective.
The coefficient of the inverse mills ratio in the teaching sector is σtc
2−σtc,ntc
σζ
, and the non-
teaching sector is σtc
2−σtc,ntc
σζ
. By definition of the positive semi-definite covariance matrix
Σ, we should have either σtc
2 − σtc,ntc > 0 or σntc2 − σtc,ntc > 0. Hence, getting negative
coefficients in both equations is not a mathematical possibility.
First, let’s discuss what the evidence of positive-selection (the positive coefficients)
means. If the coefficients of the inverse-mills ratio are positive in both equations, the skill
or ability of the workers in both sectors is higher than that of the average population skill of
a randomly assigned economy (i.e., the average ability of workers when they are randomly
assigned to each sector). For instance, in equation 4.12, the coefficient of λ(.),
σ2tc−σtc,ntc
σζ
,
is positive, only when σ2tc > σtc,ntc (since σζ is always positive). This suggests that the
distribution of an individual’s teaching ability (measured by σ2tc) is higher than the covariance
of her ability between teaching and non-teaching. The same interpretation could be given
to the positive coefficient in equation 4.13. Positive coefficients in both equations imply
that workers have selected each sector on the basis of their comparative advantage. Put
differently, those who have a lower opportunity cost in teaching (higher relative value of
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their skills) become teachers, and those who have a lower opportunity cost in non-teaching
become non-teachers.
Furthermore, the Roy model helps to understand how changes in the price of skills
in the non-teaching sector alters the distribution of ability in the teaching sector. In the
spirit of Heckman and Honore (1990), it could be shown that an increase (a decrease) in the
price of skills in non-teaching sector leads to a decrease (an increase) in the distribution of
ability in the teaching sector.18 Suppose that advancement in technology disproportionally
favors to the non-teaching sector, increasing prices of skills in that sector, then individuals
with higher than the average population skill in teaching sector switches to the non-teaching
sector. For this to happen, there should be sufficient correlation between individuals’ ability
to perform both teaching and non-teaching tasks.
Results
I estimate the conditional average wage equations for both sectors above, applying Heckman’s
two-step estimator and using the repeated cross-section data from the CPS survey years 1968-
2013.19 First, I estimate a Probit model for calculating the probability that an individual
chooses teaching given observed characteristics and calculate the inverse-mill ratios. Then,
I estimate the wage equations 4.12-4.13, using the inverse-mill ratio as a control variable. In
the literature, this econometric procedure is also known as a control function. To identify
18Note that from equation (14), lnWtc = lnpitc + lnTtc(S). And, let’s assume that task function is linear
in skill, i.e. Ttc(S) = Stc. Then, replacing log wage in equation (4.12) (lnWtc = lnpitc + Stc), and taking
derivative with respect to lnpintc (the price of skills in the non-teaching sector), I get
∂E(lnWtc|lnWtc > lnWntc)
∂lnpintc
=
∂lnpitc + Stc +
σ2tc−σtc,ntc
σζ
λ(c)
∂lnpintc
= −σ
2
tc − σtc,ntc
σζ
σζ
2λ′(c)
Consider the right term. σ2tc is always positive. λ
′(c) is positive too. Hence, as long as σtc,ntc is positive
(which happens when there is a positive correlation between teaching and non-teaching skills), the whole
term is negative.
19I exclude the survey years 1964-67, during which there is no information about children. As mentioned
below, the number of children has been used as one of the variables for exclusion restriction.
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the coefficients in the wage equation, it is expected to have at least one exclusion restriction,
i.e., a variable that affects the probability of becoming teachers, but does not directly affect
wage. (However, French and Taber [2011] point out that the exclusion restriction is not
required as identification is possible through the functional form with the inverse-mill ratio
being a non-linear function.) Following the literature, I exclude number of children and
marital status of women from the wage equation. The argument is that these variables
could influence a woman’s selection into a profession. However, they are not expected to
directly influence wages. Flyer and Rosen (1997) point out that the main attraction of
women into teaching is non-depreciation of their wage when they return to work after longer
leaves, especially maternal leaves. Also, it is well documented in the literature that female
teachers have more children than non-teachers. Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) use the
same variables to satisfy the exclusion restriction when they use the Roy model to study
self-selection of women into full-time work. Likewise, Gould (2002), who applies the Roy
model to examine the self-selection of individuals into an occupation on the basis of their
comparative advantage and the effect on wage inequality, use the marital status for the
exclusion restriction. I also use only the number of children for the exclusion restriction,
and the results are qualitatively similar. I limit the sample to women, as I do not have any
variable for the exclusion restriction for men, and the teaching profession is dominated by
women.
For reasons explained in an earlier section, I pool six-year data into eight single cross-
sectional datasets (1968-1973, 1974-1979, 1980-1985, 1996-1991, 1992-1997, 1998-2003, 2004-
2009, 2010-2013). Results are reported in Table 5. As a clarification on the interpretation of
the results, it is important to note that interest does not lie in interpreting the coefficients
of inverse-mill ratios as their effects on log wage. (The goal is not limited to getting the
consistent estimates to predict wage.) Rather, I am using the coefficients to illustrate the
distribution of ability of teachers through the evidence of self-selection. It could be recalled
that the coefficient, for instance in the teacher’s wage equation, entails the variance of ability
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in teaching and covariance of the ability between teaching and non-teaching. We could expect
declining covariance of ability between teaching and non-teaching jobs over time, as jobs have
increasingly been specialized. For instance, in earlier decades, it could have been easier for
a college graduate becoming a teacher to know or learn banking skills as banks were much
more focused on traditional roles such as lending and borrowing in earlier days. However,
over the years, the banking system has become highly specialized with inventing new banking
products, which are very hard for outsiders to understand.
There is positive selection of women into teaching before 2000, and negative selec-
tion into the non-teaching sector. This implies that women have an absolute advantage in
teaching. Their skills have higher prices in teaching than the non-teaching sector. In other
words, their ability is suited more to teaching. However, after 2000, there has been positive
selection into both sectors, which implies that women began to select on the basis of their
comparative advantage. This also indicates the possibility of declining correlation between
their abilities to teach and to perform non-teaching jobs.
Another key insight that emerges from the results is that the magnitude and strength
of statistical significance of negative selection into the non-teaching sector constantly de-
clined, eventually turning into positive selection. And, the positive selection has then be-
come stronger over time. For instance, the selection coefficient for the non-teaching sector
for 1968 to 1973 was -1.8, which declined (in terms of absolute magnitude) to -0.17 for 1998-
2003. After 2004, the coefficient became positive, and increased to 0.35 in the period for
2010-2013. However, the positive selection into teaching was increasing until the mid-’80s.
Then, it has largely declined over time, except the periods of 1998-2003 and 2010-2013. For
example, the selection coefficient was 0.095 in the period 1968-1973, increased to 0.473 in
1980-1985, and declined to 0.315 in 20004-09. Taken together, these suggest that prices of
skills have risen in the non-teaching sector over years, and the pool of talented women who
crowded in teaching earlier has begun to fade, with able women selecting the non-teaching
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sector, rather than teaching. Furthermore, I estimate the Roy model, excluding those aged
above 54 to avoid issues related to retirement, and the message is consistent (Table 6).
4.5 Cognitive Quality
In this section, as a final yardstick to determine if the falling relative wages of teachers
has led to a decline in quality, I use the relative cognitive attributes. As discussed above,
teacher quality is hard to measure as it entails several dimensions of an individual’s unob-
served attributes such as patience, a sense of humor, learning attitude, communication skills,
enthusiasm and observed cognitive skills. More important, the literature is yet to reach a
conclusion about what constitutes the most important aspect of teacher quality. So I think
it is important to look at teacher quality from different dimensions. The focus on relative
cognitive ability could be viewed as a supplement to the Roy model that I developed in
Section IV. The Roy (1951) model is helpful in assessing the unobserved teacher ability.
A growing literature has used the cognitive attributes of teachers to study the re-
lationship between teacher quality and student achievement.20 However, the literature is
not straightforward on the link between cognitive ability and teacher quality. Therefore,
it is hard to justify that cognitive attributes are a reasonable predictor of teacher quality.
Nonetheless, I think it is still important to examine cognitive attributes as they may reflect
at least some aspect of teacher quality.
I use verbal and math ability of teachers in high school, ASVAB, AFQT and IQ
scores as a proxy for cognitive skills (see Appendix for details about these variables). These
scores have increasingly been used in the literature (see Corcoran, Evans and Schwab, 2004;
Bacolod, 2007; Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Heckman, 1995). The majority of the literature
has focused on cross-sectional studies of cognitive abilities. A notable exception includes
20 Ehrenberg, Goldhaber and Brewer (1995) use verbal aptitude score, Ballou and Podgursky (2002), and
Weaver (1983) use SAT score. Hanushek and Pace (1995)also use either ACT or SAT scores.
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Corcoran, Evans and Schwab (2004) and Bacolod (2007). Using five longitudinal surveys
from five different sources covering different points of time (mostly capturing the period
from 1957 to 1992), Corcoran, Evans and Schwab (2004) show a decline in the probability
of high-quality women joining teaching over time. As in Bacolod (2007), I use three cohorts
of the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), specifically NLS of Youth 1979, NLS of Young
Women and Mature Women, NLS of Young Men and Older Men. Additionally, I supplement
these with the latest cohort, the NLS of Youth 1997. She shows that the fraction of female
and white male teachers who score above the 80th percentile has markedly declined over
time. A key difference from Bacolod (2007) is some of my estimation approaches (described
below) along with the latest cohort of data, and the sample selection. In particular, she
chooses to include all teachers with an associate degree in the estimation. Schools normally
require a four-year college degree to be a teacher. And, those with an associate degree
could be a substitute, part-time teacher or support staff. Second, and more importantly,
her comparison group is essentially professional, which include college professors or doctors.
Expectedly, college professors could be better qualified than school teachers. As in the
literature, I exclude all those with less than a bachelor’s degree, and compare teachers with
all non-teachers. To reflect the early-career occupational choices, I define an individual as a
teacher if he/she has ever mentioned teacher as a primary occupation in the survey between
the age of 21 and 31.21
I go on to assess the quality from three approaches. First, I directly calculate the
average distribution of teachers’ cognitive attributes versus non-teachers. Second, I calculate
the percentage of teachers in each cohort that have test scores at the upper quartile (80th
percentile), as the debate has focused on attracting teachers from the upper tail of the quality
distribution. Third, I calculate the estimated probability of an individual entering teaching
by quintile, using the following logit regression.22
21 For the cohort of NLS Mature Women, I use their age of the first interview, which ranges from 30-44
years.
22Our concept is same to Corcoran, Evans and Schwab (2004) who use logit model to estimate the likelihood
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Pr(yi = tc|xi) = α +Qi +Xiβ + i, (4.14)
where Qi is an IQ score, and Xi contains control variables described below. It would
have been ideal to have time-series data to measure the quality of teachers over time. How-
ever, such data are not available. As the NLS have four cohorts targeted at different age
groups in different points of time, it could still be valuable to assess the quality of teachers
over time.
I present the descriptive statistics in Table 8 for women and Table 9 for men. I
standardize the ability variables.23 Two messages stand out from the descriptive statistics
for women. First, the average quality of female teachers is lower than their counterparts.
Second, there is no secular decline in teacher quality, as generally perceived.
The average quality of female teachers in the NLS of mature women representing
the birth cohorts of 1923-1937 (ages 30-44 in 1967) is close to non-teachers. As contained
in Table 8, the self-reported high school English ability of teachers from the cohort of the
NLS of mature women is almost the same as non-teachers. However, in the same cohort,
math ability is marginally lower. Similarly, in the cohort of the NLS of Young Woman
(representing birth cohort of 1944-1954), the average IQ score of female teachers is lower. So
is the average AFQT score in the cohort of the NLS79 (representing birth cohort of 1957-
1964). Also, the average ability in the latest cohort, NLS97 (representing the birth cohort
of 1980-1984) is lower. On change in teacher quality over time, the teacher/non-teacher
gap increased from the birth cohort of 1944-1954 (NLS Young Woman) to the birth cohort
of 1957-1964 (NLS79), rising from 0.11 standard deviations to 0.17 standard deviations.
However, the gap decreased to 0.091 standard deviations in the cohort of 1980-1984 (NLS
97).
of teaching.
23 ability std = ability−abilityσˆability
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As contained in Table 9, for male teachers, the average quality seems to be higher than
that of non-teachers in the latest cohort (NLS 97). However, the relative average quality
of male teachers was lower in both the older cohorts (NLS of Young Men, and NLS 79).
Corcoran, Evans and Schwab (2004), using five different longitudinal data sources (different
from this paper’s), find an increase in the cognitive attributes of male teachers. Additionally,
I plot the entire distribution of ability. Figures 8-9 contain the kernel density of cognitive
skill (teachers versus non-teachers) for female and male separately. In all cohorts except for
women in the NLS 97, non-teachers have slightly higher density of cognitive attributes in
the upper-tail.
I also calculate the proportion of teachers, whose test scores are in the top quintile.
Table 10 contains the calculations. For the female teachers, there is a very small decline
between the cohorts of NLS Young and NLS79, and a negligible rise between the cohorts
of NLS79 and NLS97. For male teachers, the proportion is slightly increasing over time. I
could not find a big decline for teachers and rise for non-teachers that Bacolod (2007) gets,
using the same data set. The differences might have arisen from Bacolod’s (2007) sample
choice described above. My results are rather close to Corcoran, Evans and Schwab (2004),
which documents a small decline over time for female teachers and increase for male teachers
using different data sources than this paper’s.
I estimate equation (4.14) separately for each cohort to see the ranking of cognitive
attributes on the propensity to be a teacher.24 Then, I calculate the predicted probability
of an individual entering teaching by quintile. Table 11 presents results. There has been
a secular decline in the predicted probability of becoming teachers for women from the
distribution of the top 20 percentile. In all quintiles, there is a decline in the propensity
to become a teacher for women between the cohorts of NLS Young and NLS 79. This
24To make results comparable across cohorts, I try to use the same independent variables, which are age,
age-squared, race, education, region, marital status and trend along with cognitive ability variable in each
estimation. The choice of the limited covariates is due to the data constraint. My approach is similar to
Corcoran, Evans and Schwab (2004) who use only age and race.
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result reflects the fact that the number of college-graduate females considerably increased
during that period, while outside teaching opportunities increased along with a decline in
the labor market discrimination against women. However, there is a rise in the propensity in
all quintiles, except in the bottom and second-top, between NLS 79 and NLS 97. For men,
there is a decline in the average predicted probability of becoming a teacher between NLS
Young and NLS 79 in all quintiles; however, an increase between NLS 79 and NLS 97.
4.6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of the relative wages and quality
of school teachers in the U.S. over the past half-century. My analysis looks at teachers’
attributes from different dimensions over time. And, I focus on female teachers as over 75
percent of school teachers in the U.S. are women.
First, I begin looking at the relative wage of teachers. The relative lower wage for
female teachers was not a permanent phenomenon, rather a new one emerging especially
after 1990. But for male teachers, compensation has always been lower than that of non-
teachers. The wage gap of top earners at the 90th percentile is still steeper. For instance,
the gap for women that was around six percent in the mid-1960s increased to over 40 percent
in the late 2010s. The wage gap of top earners could discourage able college-graduates to
join teaching due to better prospects of salary growth in the non-teaching sector.
In order to explore what explains the declining relative wage, I use a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) framework to examine the growing demand for skills in the non-
teaching sector. I find a positive and statistically significant trend of demand for skills in
the non-teaching sector over time, which could in turn raise the wage of non-teachers, thus
widening the wage gap. Furthermore, such a secular increase in demand for skills should
have implications for teacher quality. Hence, I next use a Roy (1951) model of occupational
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choice to explore teacher quality. A key insight that emerges from the estimates of the Roy
model is that the ability of women in non-teaching sectors has steadily risen over the years;
and somewhat declining in teaching. The estimates of the Roy model have some important
policy implications. An effective approach to attract able women into teaching could be to
increase the variation of salary. The current “rigid salary schedules” might not be helpful to
deservingly compensate the talented pool of teachers.
To supplement the Roy model’s estimates, I analyze the relative cognitive attributes.
For this purpose, I use the standardized test scores as a proxy for cognitive ability, which are
obtained using data from four different cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS).
I find that teachers’ average cognitive ability is lower than that of non-teachers.
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Appendix A: Data Source
A.1 Current Population Survey
I use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from the sample years 1964 to 2013, which
cover the actual years 1963 to 2012. The current CPS survey contains information from the
preceding year. For instance, the 2013 March CPS data refers to the data from the calender
year 2012. Throughout this paper, the year refers to the survey year, not the actual calender
year from which data are drawn. The CPS, conducted jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is a monthly survey of 50,000 households. About 60,000
households are eligible for the CPS interview. I use the the March sample of the CPS, as it
provides rich individual’s demographic and income information, and it has widely been used
in the empirical works.
Education
The CPS changed the definition of education variable in 1992, prior to which education was
reported as the number of years. Since 1992, the education variable is reported in categories
of their diploma or degree (e.g, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, professional degree and
doctorate degree). In order to make the reporting of education variable comparable before
and after the change, I translate the number of education reported before 1992 into the
categories of degree. I use 16- and 17-years of education as equivalent to a four-year college
degree, and 18-years of education or above as an advanced degree. As mentioned in the text,
our estimation exclude those less than a college degree. Hence, I do not need to worry about
the redefinition below 16-years of education.
Occupation
Occupation refers to as the individual’s primary occupation during the previous calendar
year. (Note that wage refers to the total wage and salary during the previous calendar year.)
For those holding multiple jobs during the preceding year, the CPS uses the occupation in
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which the individual worked longest. We use three-digits census occupation codes to identify
teachers during 1964-2002, and four-digits census occupation codes since 2003.
A.2 National Longitudinal Survey
I obtain cognitive attributes data from four cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey
(NLS). The NLS is a nationally representative set of surveys that collect information about
labor market activities. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) conducts the NLS. A distinct
advantage of this data is its gathering of ability variables. Each cohort is a longitudinal sur-
vey. In this paper, I use four cohorts–National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97),
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), National Longitudinal Surveys of
Young Women and Mature Women (NLSW), and National Longitudinal Surveys of Young
Men and Older Men (NLSM). I use the publicly available version of the data. I provide a
brief introduction of each survey below.
NLSY97: The NLSY97 cohort is a nationally representative survey of 8,984 youths. At the
time of the first interview in 1997, respondents were ages 12-17 years (birth cohort of 1980-
1984). So far, they have been interviewed 15 times on an annual basis. The latest survey
(at the time of writing) is 2011. I use the data from all 15 surveys 1997-2011.
NLSY79: The original sample size of the NLSY79 Cohort is 12,686 young men and women.
In the first survey of 1979, respondents were aged 14-22 years (birth cohort of 1957-1964).
The individuals were interviewed on an annual basis until 1994. Since then, they have been
interviewed biennially.
NLSW: It has two groups (Mature Women and Young Women). The Mature Womens cohort
includes 5,083 women aged 30-44 years (birth cohort of 1922-1937) in the first survey of 1967.
These women were in their early- or mid-career at the time of the first interview. And, they
could be representative of teachers quality in 1950s and 1960s. The Young Womens cohort
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includes 5,159. The respondents were aged 14-24 years (birth cohort of 1943-1953) at the
first interview of 1968, and they were followed up until 2003. However, I only follow up
individuals when they were aged 21-31 years.
NLSM: The Young Mens cohort had 5,225 men aged 14-24 years (birth cohort of 1941-1952)
in their first interview of 1966. The survey was discontinued in 1981.
Variables Construction
i) Cognitive Attributes: There is not a consistent measure of cognitive skill across cohorts.
However, except the NLS of Mature Women, all cohorts include IQ information (albeit
measured slight differently) making it largely comparable across the cohorts. For the NLS
of Mature Women, we use the self-reported math and English performance as a measure of
cognitive ability. The survey asked respondents how well they did in math and English in
high school. They rated their performance on the scale of 1-5.
NLS of Young Women/Young Men
The IQ score is referred to a composite score created by combining scholastic or aptitude
tests. The tests are the Otis/Beta/Gamma, the California Test of Mental Maturity, and
the Lorge-Thorndike Intelligence Test, as well as the PSAT, SAT, and ACT college entrance
examinations.
NLS of 79
As a proxy for IQ, we use Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) scores which are calculated
from the variable ASVAB, which refers to Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test.
Some 11,914 of the 12,686 NLS79 respondents were selected to participate in the ASVAB
test in 1980. It tests respondents knowledge and skill in 10 areas (general science, arithmetic
reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, numerical operations, coding speed,
auto and shop information, mathematics knowledge, mechanical comprehension, and elec-
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tronics information). The scores were renormed twice in 1989 (named AFQT-2) and 2006
(named AFQT-3). I use the AFQT-3.
NLS of 97
For the NLS97 cohorts, I use the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test, which
is designated as ASVAB MATH VERBAL SCORE PCT in the NLS97 survey. The test
measures respondent’s knowledge and skills in areas of arithmetic reasoning, electronics in-
formation, numerical operations, assembling objects, general science, paragraph comprehen-
sion, auto information, mathematics knowledge, shop information, coding speed, mechanical
comprehension word knowledge. Importantly, this variable is similar to the 1979 AFQT
score.
ii) Teacher: In all cohorts, teacher is defined as the one who has mentioned his/her main
job as a teacher in any survey year. The NLS documents occupations according to the census
3-digit codes. I use the three-digit census 1960-, 1970-, 1990-, and 2000 codes.
iii) Education: Education is documented differently in each cohort. Hence, I describe here
how I calculate the level of education. I use 16- or 17-years of education as a bachelors degree,
and 18-years of education or above as an advanced degree (an master’s degree or beyond).
Identifying education level in the NLS97 is straightforward. The cohort includes a cumulative
variable that documents the highest degree ever received by respondents regardless of the
survey year.
For the cohort of NLS79, education is defined in terms of number of years before 1987
and from then onwards it is categorized in terms of degree. First I use the first interviews
education (the survey 1979) and update education information each survey until 1986. (Each
survey asks the highest level of education.) Then I convert the number of years of education
into degrees (12 or 13 years of education as a high school, 14- or 15- years of education as an
associate degree, 16- or 17-years of education as a bachelors degree, and 18-years or above
as a graduate degree). The goal is to link education information though 1986 to 1987 when
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the NLS begin asking the highest degree received. Then, I update education degree using
education information in each survey.
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Figure 1: Mean Annual Log Wages of Teachers versus Non-teachers
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Note: Mean annual log wages are calculated using the CPS data, covering years
1964-2013.
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Figure 2: Mean Hourly Wages of Teachers versus Non-teachers
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Notes: Mean hourly log wages are calculated using the CPS data, covering years 1976-
2013. Prior to 1976, the CPS data do not contain information about the number of
hours worked.
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Figure 3: Teaching versus Finance and Engineering
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Note: Mean annual log wages are calculated using the CPS data, covering years
1964-2013.
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Figure 4: OLS Estimates for Annual Wages
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Notes: Using the CPS data from 1964-2013, I estimate the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression for each year with annual log wage as a dependent variable, and
plot the coefficients of the dummy variable for teachers.
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Figure 5: OLS Estimates for Hourly Wages
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Note: Using the CPS data from 1964-2013, I estimate the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression for each year with hourly log wage as a dependent variable, and
plot the coefficients of the dummy variable for teachers.
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Figure 6: Annual Wage Distributions at the 10th and 90th Percentiles: RIF Regression
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Notes: Using the CPS data from 1964-2013, I estimate the recentered influence func-
tion (RIF) regression to calcualte the annual log wage differentials of teachers versus
non-teachers at the 10th and 90th percentiles. The coefficients are estimated for each
year separately for men and women.
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Figure 7: Annual Wage Distributions at the 10th and 90th Percentiles
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Notes: Using the CPS data from 1964-2013, I estimate the conditional quantile re-
gression to get the annual log wage differentials of teachers versus non-teachers at the
10th and 90th percentiles. The coefficients are estimated for each year separately for
men and women.
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Table 1: Oxcana-Blinder Decomposition: Female
Mean Log wage of Mean Log Differences Explained Unexplained
Non-Teachers Wage of Teachers
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1964-1969 9.96∗∗∗ 10.093∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.018) (0.031) (0.014) (0.032)
1970-1975 10.156∗∗∗ 10.284∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.015)
1976-1981 10.127∗∗∗ 10.226∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.098∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013)
1982-1987 10.202∗∗∗ 10.259∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.021∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.01) (0.005) (0.011)
1988-1993 10.335∗∗∗ 10.381∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.017∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
1994-1999 10.404∗∗∗ 10.392∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.032∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
2000-2005 10.511∗∗∗ 10.459∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
2006-2013 10.525∗∗∗ 10.431∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Notes: Entries in the table are calculated using the Oxcana-Blinder Decomposition.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2: Oxcana-Blinder Decomposition: Male
Mean Log wage of Mean Log Differences Explained Unexplained
Non-Teachers wage of Teachers
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1964-1969 10.672∗∗∗ 10.451∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.02)
1970-1975 10.814∗∗∗ 10.684∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
1976-1981 10.73∗∗∗ 10.584∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ -0.006 0.152∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
1982-1987 10.702∗∗∗ 10.555∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.01) (0.006) (0.01)
1988-1993 10.738∗∗∗ 10.642∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.01) (0.006) (0.01)
1994-1999 10.78∗∗∗ 10.611∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
2000-2005 10.891∗∗∗ 10.632∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.01) (0.011) (0.006) (0.01)
2006-2013 10.863∗∗∗ 10.585∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Notes: Entries in the table are calculated using the Oxcana-Blinder Decomposition.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3: Regression Models for Demand for Skills
Variables Men Women
Time trend 0.006763∗∗∗ 0.009337∗∗∗
0.0016704 0.0009593
NTC/TC relative supply -0.8615522∗∗∗ -0.9062199∗∗∗
0.08504 0.0235503
Constant 0.4716475∗∗∗ -0.0870002∗∗∗
0.1643658 0.0107792
Observations 50 50
R-squared 0.9586 0.9973
Notes: The estimates are calculated aggregating the CPS
data from 1964-2013. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 4: The Effect of Union on Teacher Pay
Women Men
1990-00 2001-13 1990-0 0 2001-13
Union Teacher -0.050∗∗∗ -0.025 -0.025 -0.001
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
Union 0.076∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Teacher -0.021∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009)
Metro Outskirts 0.153∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
Metro Central 0.117∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016)
Age 0.074∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Age-squared -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black -0.057∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
Other Race -0.114 -0.069∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.028) (0.041) (0.038)
Const 8.437∗∗∗ 8.690∗∗∗ 8.177∗∗∗ 8.472∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.044) (0.062) (0.061)
N 63106 142464 87725 172282
R2 0.081 0.085 0.137 0.135
Notes: The estimates are calculated using the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5: Roy Model
Teacher Non-teachers
Period Selection Coeff. N Selection Coeff. N
1968-1973 0.095 -1.837
(0.149) (0.179)
[0.636] [-10.286]
1974-1979 0.377 -1.065
(0.102) 0.115
[3.686] [-9.22]
1980-1985 0.473 -0.811
(0.066) (0.094)
[7.127] [-8.639]
1986-1991 0.416 -0.605
(0.057) (0.075)
[7.324] [-8.062]
1992-1997 0.333 -0.352
(0.055) (0.078)
[6.069] [-4.483]
1998-2003 0.45 -0.173
(0.054) (0.074)
[8.264] [-2.33]
2004-2009 0.315 0.14
(0.046) (0.063)
[6.8] [2.219]
2010-2013 0.348 0.356
(0.077) (0.096)
[4.52] [3.69]
Notes: The parameters of Roy Model are estimated, us-
ing the CPS data. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses, and t-values are in brackets.
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Table 6: Roy Model: Aged 25-54 years
Teacher Non-teachers
Period Selection Coeff. N Selection Coeff. N
1968-1973 0.25 -2.078
(0.181) (0.209)
[1.385] [-9.928]
1974-1979 0.499 -1.207
(0.117) (0.125)
[4.252] [-9.68]
1980-1985 0.502 -0.803
(0.068) (0.096)
[7.392] [-8.329]
1986-1991 0.411 -0.63
(0.055) (0.075)
[7.474] [-8.42]
1992-1997 0.326 -0.389
(0.053) (0.075)
[6.207] [-5.193]
1998-2003 0.423 -0.155
(0.053) (0.071)
[7.947] [-2.173]
2004-2009 0.326 0.095
(0.044) (0.063)
[7.364] [1.51]
2010-2013 0.341 0.347
(0.083) (0.101)
[4.1] [3.448]
Notes: The parameters of Roy Model are estimated, us-
ing the CPS data. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses, and t-values are in brackets.
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Table 8: Distribution of Average Cognitive Skills: Women
Cohort Variable Teacher N Non-teachers N
NLS of Mature Women
Math Performance 3.91 138 4.07 155
English Performance 4.303 164 4.304 192
NLS of Young Women
IQ score 0.078 243 0.188 467
NLS79
AFQT 0.0961 48 0.2643 831
NLS79
ASVAB 0.0632 271 0.1543 469
Notes: Math and English performances are self-reported on a scale, 1-5. IQ, AFQT, and
ASVAB variables are standardized.
Table 9: Distribution of Average Cognitive Skills: Men
Cohort Variable Teacher N Non-teachers N
NLS of Young Men
IQ score 0.0726 162 0.0929 1591
NLS79
AFQT 0.132 15 0.167 934
NLS97
ASVAB 0.238 106 0.0828 423
Notes: Math and English performances are self-reported on a scale, 1-5.
IQ, AFQT, and ASVAB variables are standardized.
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Figure 8: Distribution of IQ: Women
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Note: Kernel density estimators are calculated using the default band-
width.
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Figure 9: Distribution of IQ: Men
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Table 10: Proportion of Teachers in the Top Quintile of
Quality Distribution
Women Men
Teacher Non-teacher Teacher Non-teacher
NLS Young 0.166 0.227 0.162 0.205
NLS79 0.153 0.216 0.211 0.198
NLS97 0.158 0.215 0.220 0.196
Notes: The entries refer to the proportion of teachers whose IQ
distribution is in the 1st quintile (the top 20th percentile).
Table 11: Predicted Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Women
NLS Young 0.490 0.458 0.497 0.443 0.390
NLS79 0.352 0.282 0.235 0.276 0.208
NLS97 0.277 0.332 0.259 0.267 0.215
Men
NLS Young 0.234 0.216 0.198 0.146 0.160
NLS79 0.121 0.094 0.080 0.093 0.116
NLS97 0.144 0.116 0.154 0.182 0.172
Notes: (5) refers to the top 20 percentile (1st quin-
tile), and (1) refers to the bottom 20 percentile (5th
quintile)
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